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Microsoft v. Commission indicates a shift in competition policy at the
expense of protections for intellectual property. The case applies "essential
facilities" arguments to Microsoft's server operating system and "tying"
arguments to its Windows Media Player. The dynamic effects of Microsoft v.
Commission pose a substantial risk to the incentive to innovate in several
ways. First, mandatory licensing and unbundling of the elements of an
invention erode intellectual property rights. Second, the targeting of
multinational corporations by the European Union creates barriers to
international trade whose impacts extend across the global economy. Third, the
interpretation of "abuse of a dominant position "focuses on market outcomes
rather than on anticompetitive conduct, thus penalizing successful innovators
and rewarding their competitors. Competition policy based on Microsoft v.
Commission diminishes the incentive to innovate.
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Introduction
Microsoft v. Commission heralds an activist European competition policy
that threatens incentives to innovate around the world. The European Court of
First Instance's (Court) decision to uphold the fmdings of the Commission of
the European Communities (Commission) combines actions in both business
and consumer markets. On the business side, the Commission charged that
Microsoft's server operating system had an unfair advantage over other server
operating systems, effectively requiring Microsoft to unbundle individual
elements of the software program and make them available to competitors. The
decision treats individual elements of a software program as "essential
I Case T-201/04, Microsoft v. Comm'n, 2007 E.C.R. 11-1 (2007); see also Commission
Decision of 24.03.2004, Relating to a Proceeding Under Article 82 of the EC Treaty (Case COMPIC-
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facilities." On the consumer side, the Commission's decision addressed the
market for software applications through its charge that Microsoft abused its
dominant position by "tying" Media Player with Windows. The decision
extends unbundling and compulsory access from product bundles to the
elements of individual products.
Microsoft v. Commission will adversely impact incentives to innovate in
three main ways. First, Microsoft v. Commission is an attack on intellectual
property (IP) rights that reduces firms' incentives to innovate. Successful firms
risk having their inventions disclosed to competitors and unsuccessful firms
expect to obtain inventions from successful firms by threatening to file antitrust
complaints. The decision significantly weakens protections for IP. By
sanctioning Microsoft for not disclosing fundamental innovations to its server
software to its rivals, the Court will reduce incentives to invest in costly
research and development (R&D). The returns to R&D for most firms would
be reduced or eliminated if they were required to disclose the results to their
competitors, allowing competitors to either adopt or copy the inventions. The
Court's decision also deters innovation by competitors of leading firms. Why
invest in costly R&D, when you can get it for free from the leading company in
your industry? Simply send the leading company a request for the use of any
and all of its innovations, and threaten to complain to the antitrust authorities if
there is not full compliance. Since a leading company's failure to supply the
innovation is ruled to be an "abuse," companies with smaller market shares will
know where to obtain free innovations. The Commission argued that
competition policy trumps protections for IP. By eroding the foundations of IP,
incentives to innovation in any industry will suffer, not just in computer
software. The interoperability side of the case establishes a major precedent
that will impact IP protections throughout the EU in many industries.
Second, Microsoft v. Commission raises barriers to international trade by
attacking entry of foreign firms into the European marketplace, thus further
reducing incentives to innovate. The European Union represents almost one
third of total world Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The fines, legal costs, and
regulatory sanctions associated with Microsoft v. Commission have the impact
of non-tariff barriers to trade. The European Commission is itself an instrument
of trade policy for the European Union. The use of competition policy to
restrict trade avoids the scrutiny of the World Trade Organization that might
accompany explicit trade restrictions. Competition policy that restricts access
of foreign competitors to European markets functions as a form of industrial
policy that protects and subsidizes European companies. The forced disclosure
and compulsory access to intellectual property of foreign firms further serves
as a form of industrial policy and subsidization of European companies.
Third, Microsoft v. Commission penalizes market outcomes rather than
anticompetitive behavior, thus reducing incentives to innovate competitively.
The decision is based on an allegation that Microsoft abused a dominant market
position. The actions in question are not those that created the dominant market
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position, hence they are not alleged to represent monopolization or exclusion in
themselves. The actions also are not deemed to be abuse for firms that are not
in a dominant market position. The charge of abuse of a dominant position thus
penalizes a successful firm for market outcomes rather than anticompetitive
behavior. The Court's decision reduces the returns to innovation because firms
that achieve market leadership through successful innovations are penalized for
achieving a dominant position. Competitive actions that would be viewed as
benign for firms that are not market leaders are interpreted as abusive. By
penalizing Microsoft for bundling its Media Player with Windows, the Court
will make companies reluctant to add innovative features to their products.
The Commission's wide-ranging actions herald Europe's competition
policy towards innovation. These actions have implications far beyond
information technology (IT). The use of competition policy as a targeted
instrument of trade policy is evidenced by cases such as those against Visa,2
MasterCard,3 Intel,4 Qualcomm, 5 Rambus 6 and Google.7 The Commission's
"Statement of Objections" (SO) states the preliminary view that "Intel has
infringed the EC Treaty rules on abuse of a dominant position (Article 82) with
the aim of excluding its main rival, AMD, from the x86 Computer Processing
Units (CPU) market." 8 The Commission was clearly aware of the long-term
consequences of its competition policy. Commissioner Kroes observed that
"The repercussions of these changes will start now and will continue for years
to come."
9
The precedent set by Microsoft v. Commission became apparent when the
Commission subsequently opened an "antitrust campaign" against Microsoft's
2 Press Release, European Comm'n, Antitrust: Comm'n Fines Visa E10.2 Million for
Refusing to Admit Morgan Stanley as a Member (Mar. 10, 2007), http://europa.eu/rapid/
pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/07/1436.
3 Press Release, European Comm'n, Antitrust: Comm'n Prohibits MasterCard's lntra-EEA
Multilateral Interchange Fees (Dec. 19, 2007), http://europa.eu/rapid/
pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/07/1959.
4 Press Release, European Comm'n, Competition: Comm'n Confirms Sending of Statement of
Objections to Intel (July 27, 2007), http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?
reference=MEMO/07/314.
5 Press Release, European Comm'n, Antitrust: Comm'n Initiates Formal Proceedings Against
Qualcomm (Oct. 1, 2007), http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do? reference=MEMO/07/389.
6 Press Release, European Comm'n, Antitrust: Comm'n Confirms Sending a Statement of
Objections to Rambus (Aug. 23, 2007),
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/07/330.
7 Press Release, European Comm'n, Mergers: Commission Opens In-depth Investigation into
Google's Proposed Take Over of Double-Click (Nov. 13, 2007), http://europa.eu/rapid/
pressReleasesAction.do?reference= IP/07/1688.
8 Press Release, European Comm'n, supra note 4 ("First, Intel has provided substantial
rebates to various Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) conditional on them obtaining all or the
great majority of their CPU requirements from Intel. Secondly, in a number of instances, Intel made
payments in order to induce an OEM to either delay or cancel the launch of a product line incorporating
an AMD-based CPU. Thirdly, in the context of bids against AMD-based products for strategic
customers in the server segment of the market, Intel has offered CPUs on average below cost.").
9 David Lawsky, Microsoft Finally Bows to EU Antitrust Measures, REUTERS, Oct. 22, 2007,
http://uk.reuters.com/article/UKNews 1/idUKKIM25281920071022.
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core technology strategy. The new investigation targeted applications software
that form Microsoft's Office Suite, including software for word-processing
(Word), spreadsheets (Excel), presentations (PowerPoint), publishing
(Publisher), and communications (Outlook). An additional investigation would
consider the alleged "tying" of the Internet Explorer browser to Windows, the
".Net" Internet-based applications that run on Windows, and the connections
between the Outlook and Exchange e-mail programs.' 0 The investigation was
triggered when Opera Software of Norway filed a complaint against Microsoft
with the European Commission, although the Commission was already well
prepared. It accused Microsoft of abuse of its dominant position in operating
systems for personal computers by bundling its web browser Internet Explorer
with Windows. Opera also alleged that Microsoft reduced interoperability by
not using open Web standards." The Commission proceeded despite the fact
that the secondary market, Internet web browsers, was highly competitive.
Mozilla's Firefox was freely available and was the leading alternative to
Internet Explorer. Safari was the default browser on Apple's Mac but could
also run on Windows computers. Netscape was still available albeit with a
small market share. Opera had a negligible market share of desktops but a
larger presence on cell phones.12
This Article is organized as follows. Section I reviews the particulars of
Microsoft v. Commission. Sections II examines the implications of the case for
IP protection and the resulting implications for the incentive to innovate.
Section III considers how the case affects firms' competitive strategies and the
relationship between competitive strategy and the incentive to innovate.
Section IV examines the effects of the case on barriers to international trade
and the consequences for incentives to innovate.
I. How Microsoft v. Commission Affects IP Rights
The Court upheld the Commission's charge that Microsoft had infringed
Article 82 of the European Community (EC) Treaty by its "abuse of a
dominant position."' 13 The case involved two types of software, the Windows
10 Richard Waters, EU Launches New Microsoft Antitrust Probe, FIN. TIMES ONLINE, Jan. 14,
2008, http://us.ft.com/ftgateway/superpage.ft?news_id=fto011420081217021991; Jennifer L. Schenker,
EU-Microsoft i: The Rematch, Bus. WK. ONLINE, Jan. 15, 2008,
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/jan2008/tc20080114_194423.htm.
11 Tom Espiner, Microsoft Strikes Back at Opera Antitrust Claims, CNET NETWORKS, Dec.
14, 2007, http://www.news.comMicrosoft-strikes-back-at-Opera-antitrust-claims/
2100-1016_3-6222809.html.
12 David Sharmah, Digital World: Night at the Opera, JERUSALEM POST, Jan. 1, 2008, at 18.
13 Case T-201/04, Microsoft v. Comm'n (Microsoft), 2007 E.C.R. 1I-1, 11-9; see also Treaty
Establishing the European Community, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 3 [hereinafter EC Treaty], art.
82 (concerning pricing, exclusion, price discrimination, and tying). The Commission also relied on
Agreement on European Economic Area, May 2, 1992, 1994 O.J. (L 1) 3 [hereinafter EEA], art. 54.
Both articles are very similar with the main difference that instead of the common market, EEA art. 54
refers to "the territory covered by this Agreement or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as
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Server operating system and Windows Media Player. The Commission alleged
that Microsoft had a dominant position in both client PC operating systems and
work group server operating systems. The Court found that Microsoft had
abused its dominant position by not supplying interoperability information to
its competitors for its Windows Server operating system. The Court also found
that Microsoft had abused its dominant position by bundling its Media Player
with its Windows PC operating system.
This Section examines the main developments in the case. The main
issues pertaining to the Windows Server operating system were disclosure of IP
based on the need for interoperability, unbundling and access to IP, and the
antitrust treatment of IP based on essential facilities doctrine. The main issues
with regards to Windows Media Player were the Commission's network effects
theory, its definition of the product market, and the alleged tying of the terms
of contracts with personal computer makers.
A. Windows Server Operating System
1. Disclosure of IP and Interoperability
Microsoft v. Commission grew out of a complaint by Sun Microsystems
(Sun) before the European Commission. Sun alleged that Microsoft had
withheld information about its server computer operating systems that Sun
needed for its Solaris-based servers to interoperate fully with Microsoft's PC
operating systems. 14 Sun, a maker of network-computing hardware and
software, requested access to Microsoft's IP in September of 1998. The request
included source code for Windows Server 2000, a software product that was
still under development at that time. Additionally, Sun requested a substantial
amount of secret information including detailed technical descriptions of
Windows server operating systems.15 From Microsoft's perspective, the IP
requested by Sun precisely targeted its innovations.' 
6
Upon Sun's allegations, the Commission initiated a series of actions and
investigations based on Article 82, particularly concerning "limiting
production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers."
incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement in so far as it may affect trade between Contracting
Parties."
14 Commission Decision, supra note 1, at 5.
15 See Ian S. Forrester, Address at the International Bar Association 11 th Annual Competition
Conference in Fiesole, Italy: Unilateral Conduct in Global High-Tech Industries: The Implications for
the Future of the Microsoft Case, the Server Technology Issues (Sept. 7-8, 2007) (stating that Sun's
request also was remarkable for what it did not contain. The request did not specify communications
protocols, which would lie at the heart of the Commission's case. Furthermore, Sun's request did not
explicitly seek to license Microsoft's technology. Microsoft's reply also was significant in what it did
not contain. Microsoft requested a meeting with Sun without any explicit refusal to deal and without an
assertion of IP rights).
16 Id
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17 Effectively, Microsoft was alleged to have excluded Sun from the market for
servers by refusing to provide its technology to Sun.
The Commission found Microsoft held a dominant position in PC
operating systems, even though the issue at hand concerned server operating
systems. The Commission applied several criteria: Windows had a large market
share, Windows set an operating system standard, and Windows's "indirect
network effects" created barriers to entry. 18 In addition, the Commission found
that Microsoft held a dominant position in server operating systems because of
its high market share relative to Novell Netware, Linux, and other Unix
vendors, because of entry barriers due to network effects, and because of links
with the PC market.
19
The Court's definition of work group server operating systems refers to
"operating systems designed and marketed to deliver collectively 'basic
infrastructure services' to relatively small numbers of client PCs connected to
small or medium-sized networks." 20 The relevant feature of Microsoft's
Windows 2000 Server operating system is Active Directory. This feature
coordinates services, such as file sharing and e-mail, networked resources, such
as shared printers, and administration of users. In practice, Active Directory is
employed by companies and other organizations that manage networks of all
sizes, with some reaching millions of services, resources and users.
Windows 2000 technology with its Active Directory feature offered some
improvements relative to the earlier Windows NT server operating system. As
the Commission noted, a useful feature was that it allowed administrators
"centrally to manage collections of users, computers, applications and other
network resources instead of managing [those] objects on a one-by-one
basis.' 2 1 Windows 2000 further allowed the management of files on both client
PCs and work group servers, using the "Distributed File System., 22 The
Commission found that the architecture of the Windows work group server
networks facilitated interactions between servers and between servers and PC
clients. Such interactions allowed 'transparent access' to the main services
provided by work group servers."
23
The protocols that are essential to interoperability include both
server/server interaction and client/server interaction. The Commission's main
argument here rests on the assertion that interaction between servers was
closely connected to the interaction between servers and PC clients. The Court
17 Commission Decision, supra note 1, at 5.
18 Case T-201/04, Microsoft v. Comm'n, 2007 E.C.R. 11-1, 11-8 (2007) (citing the
Commission's finding that Microsoft had over ninety percent of PC operating system software).
19 Id. (citing the Commission's finding that Microsoft had over sixty percent market share of
work group server operating system software). This definition did not include all other types of servers
including systems for larger networks.
20 Id. at 11-33.
21 Id. at 11-35.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 11-38.
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agreed with the Commission that "the common ability to be part of [the
Windows domain architecture] is a feature of compatibility between Windows
client PCs and Windows work group servers." 24 Active Directory, which lies
within the Windows server operating system, was targeted as an essential
facility.
Yet, the critical part of interoperability that concerns providers of either
server software or PC software is whether these work together when provided
by different software firms. This is sometimes referred to as "multivendor
interoperability." 25 Microsoft provided "multivendor interoperability" and
additional features that allowed its own servers to work together in innovative
ways. This feature had value to its customers and represented an innovation in
comparison with other companies' server software.
In the name of interoperability, the Court and the Commission extended
the usual server/client interoperability to the new server/server interoperability.
By obtaining the technology, a competitor of Microsoft, such as Sun, would be
able to achieve similar interoperability between its own servers. This outcome
would not contribute to interoperability in the usual sense of the term. Instead,
the result would be to transfer a firm's innovation to its competitors.
The Commission's definition of abuse of a dominant position was that
Microsoft should have disclosed "specifications" and not their
"implementation." The Commission defined "specifications" as a "description"
of the functions of the software protocols in contrast to "implementation"
which it defines as the "source code." The Court found that what was needed
from Microsoft was a "detailed technical description of certain rules of
interconnection and interaction that can be used within the Windows work
group networks to deliver work group services."
26
The Court, the Commission and Microsoft seemed to agree that
"interoperability was a matter of degree." 27 The question was whether or not
disclosure was also a matter of degree. By disclosing so-called specifications to
a competitor, the result would be that competitors could learn the necessary
technology for coordination between servers. Even without the disclosure of
specific source code, the effect would be the same. Rather than multivendor
interoperability, the result would be that competing vendors would obtain the
technological innovation that would improve the functioning of their servers.
Moreover, competitors would be able to make their servers
interchangeable with those of Microsoft. A customer would then be indifferent
between buying a group of Windows-based servers, a group of Sun's Solaris
servers, and more significantly, a mixture of the two. The interoperability in
question refers to that within a software program rather than between software
24 Id. at 11-39.
25 Id. at 11-43.
26 Id. at 11-42.
27 Id. at 11-32.
Vol. 25:2, 2008
Dynamic Effects of Microsoft
programs. This stretches the conventional notion of interoperability beyond the
breaking point.
A software program is composed of multiple elements that together
deliver the software's various functionalities. For the software to function, its
elements must work together harmoniously. This is a type of interoperability
that occurs within a software program. This type of interoperability is different
from the exchange of information between different software programs. It
refers to the exchange of information within a software program. As Microsoft
argued, to license communications protocols necessarily meant disclosing
intellectual property since these could not be separated from the internal
workings of its operating system software.
Microsoft argued that "full interoperability is available to a developer of
server operating systems when all of the functionality of his program can be
accessed from a Windows client operating system." 28 Existing protocols
already provided for full multivendor interoperability. Instead, Microsoft
maintained that the Commission required Microsoft to provide sufficient
technology that its competitors' servers would perform as clones of those with
Microsoft Windows operating systems. This extends the notion of
interoperability to the additional requirement that competing servers offer the
same functionalities.
In contrast, the Commission argued that "client/server and server/server
interoperability are closely interlinked and, in order that full interoperability
can be achieved between a Windows client PC and a non-Microsoft server
operating system, Microsoft must give access both to the client/server
communication protocols and to the server/server communication protocols."
29
The Commission maintained that Microsoft's competitors would use
Microsoft's interoperability technology to develop, not clones, but "improved
products, with 'added value.'
30
The Court agreed that "by nature, interoperability implies a 'two-way'
relationship in that it states that 'the function of a computer program is to
communicate and work together with other components of a computer
system. ' ' 31 The Court's argument is misleading. Citing a general definition of
interoperability does not provide support for the notion that all parts of a
computer system must work together even if offered by different firms. This
approach extends the definition of interoperability between systems to
interoperability within computer systems.
The Court further argued that Microsoft's dominant market position
trumps the relevant definition of interoperability. For the Court, the key
question is whether competitors need the technology. Competitors, in the view
28 Id. at 11-43.
29 Id. at 11-44.
30 Id. at 11-45.
31 Id.
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of the Court, must be able to deliver all of the functionalities that Microsoft
delivers. By sweeping aside interoperability, the Court simply meant that
competitors must be able to offer products with the same quality as those of
Microsoft-but that they cannot do so without access to Microsoft's
technology. The Court's argument suggests that competitors' servers cannot
interoperate with each other in a manner consistent with Microsoft's server
software. This addresses a critical feature of Microsoft's product quality
innovation. Providing technological information about this feature may
improve the performance of competitor software, but this differs from the
standard interpretation of interoperability.
The Court's argument reduces to the following: Competitors' work group
servers must be
capable of receiving a specific message from a Windows client PC or work group
server operating system and giving the required response to that message on the
same conditions as a Windows work group server operating system and also of
enabling Windows client PC or work group server operating systems to react to
that response just as though it came from a Windows work group server operating
system.
32
The Court pointed out that the competitors' operating systems need not
function internally in a manner identically to that of Microsoft and that
competing operating systems may offer improvements in "security, reliability,
processing speed or the innovative nature of certain functionalities." 33 These
protestations aside, the Court required disclosure of technology that
competitors can use selectively to improve their products.
2. Unbundling and Access to IP
The disclosure requirements of the Court have the effect of unbundling
the elements of a specific software program. With selective disclosure of
individual elements of software, a competitor can assemble a similar software
program by combining elements of an incumbent firm's software with some of
its own elements. A competitor need not invest in designing all the elements of
a software program. Rather, it can design some elements and obtain the missing
elements from an incumbent firm. The result will be a software program that
has the look, feel, and performance of the incumbent firm's software.
The Court's view of interoperability in software is analogous to
unbundling of telecommunications in the U.S. Telecommunications Act of
1996. 34 Under the Act, a competitor could request access to particular lines,
32 Id. at !1-47.
33 Id. at 11-48.
34 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, §101, 110 Stat. 56, 61 (1996).
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switches and other elements of an incumbent firm's telecommunications
system. This is referred to as "unbundled access." The competitor could then
add its own elements and construct a complete network composed of some
elements from the incumbent and some of its own. The idea was to reduce the
costs of a competitive entrant below that required to establish an entire new
network. The unbundling notion extended the antitrust concept of "essential
facilities." Regulators in countries that mandated unbundling in
telecommunications failed to achieve their goals. In a five-country study,
Hausman and Sidak found that mandated unbundling did not achieve such
regulatory objectives as lower prices, increased competition in retail and
wholesale markets, more facilities-based investment,, and greater innovation.
35
This approach to disclosure represents a radical extension of the
regulatory idea of unbundling in the U.S. Department of Justice case against
Microsoft. The Commission was influenced by the outcome and substance of
the U.S. case. 36 The Commission's decision in 2004 followed the U.S. district
court's judgment adopting a consent agreement between Microsoft and the U.S.
government and various states by a little over one year.37 In the U.S. case, the
issue was unbundling an application, Internet Explorer, from the Windows PC
operating system. In the European case, unbundling extends beyond separating
applications from an operating system. It even goes beyond separating
functionalities within the operating system itself. Rather, unbundling reaches
all the way to individual elements within the Windows Server operating system
software.
A particularly troublesome issue was whether IP could be unbundled into
components that were themselves essential facilities. From Microsoft's
perspective, Active Directory was an innovative technology worthy of IP
protections, and not merely a means of interoperability. Developing the
technology had required costly R&D investment and the company viewed the
technology as having commercial value. Microsoft already had received patent
protections for Active Directory. The specifications of the protocols were
protected by copyright. Finally, the protocols were trade secrets with
commercial value.
38
3. Application of Essential Facilities Doctrine to IP
The Commission applied an essential facilities approach to intellectual
property. In their view, for competitors to achieve the same functionalities as
an incumbent firm's software they must have access to its IP. This extended the
35 Jerry A. Hausman & J. Gregory Sidak, Did Mandatory Unbundling Achieve Its Purpose?
Empirical Evidence from Five Countries, I J. OF COMPETITION L. & ECON. 173 (2005).
36 U.S. v. Microsoft Corp. 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
37 See U.S. v. Microsoft 231 F.Supp.2d 144, 150 (D.D.C. 2002).
38 Microsoft, 2007 E.C.R. at 11-53-54.
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reach of the essential facilities doctrine. 39 It alleged that Microsoft abused a
dominant position in server software by not disclosing technological
information. The Commission charged Microsoft with not providing
interoperability information, defined as the
complete and accurate specifications for all the protocols [implemented] in
Windows work group server operating systems and.. . used by Windows work
group servers to deliver file and print services and group and user administrative
services, including the Windows domain controller services, Active Directory
services and "group Policy" services to Windows work group networks. °
The Court observed that "the Commission emphasizes that the refusal in
question does not relate to Microsoft's 'source code,' but only to specifications
of the protocols concerned, that is to say, to a detailed description of what the
software in question must achieve, in contrast to the implementations,
consisting in the implementation of the code on the computer."'
4
Prior EU cases Magil142 and IMS Health43 treat the licensing of
intellectual property as "essential facilities." Refusal to grant a license is
abusive if the product or service is "indispensable" for a particular line of
business, if such refusal excludes all competitors, if the refusal prevents
competitors from supplying new products demanded by consumers, and if the
refusal is not justified in some way. These cases apply arguments that are
analogous to more standard cases in which essential facilities are physical
infrastructure. For example, in Bronner, a newspaper publisher Oscar Bronner
desired access to the distribution facilities of Mediaprint.
44
Microsoft and the Commission disagreed on whether IP met the test for a
facility to be essential. The Court found that competition policy trumps IP
rights if the IP is "indispensable" to an activity in the secondary market, which
is another way of saying it is "essential. 45 The refusal to license IP creates a
problem if it is likely to "eliminate all competition" in the secondary market.
46
Finally, the refusal to license IP creates a competitive problem if it hinders the
39 See Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Mandating Access to Telecom and the
Internet: The Hidden Side of Trinko, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 1822 (2007) (illustrating the U.S. Supreme
Court's limitations on the application of essential facilities arguments); see also Schor v. Abbott Labs.,
457 F.3d 608, 610 (7th Cir. 2006) (stating that "antitrust law does not require monopolists to cooperate
with rivals by selling them products that would help the rivals to compete.... Cooperation is a problem
in antitrust, not one of its obligations," and refusing to license IP not violating the Sherman Act, even if
it affects a secondary market) (citing Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis v. Trinko, LLP,
540 U.S. 398 (2004)).
40 Microsoft, 2007 E.C.R. at 11-9-10.
41 Id. at II-10.
42 Joined Cases C-241/91 P & C-242/91 P, RTE v. Comm'n (Magill), 1995 E.C.R. 1-743.
43 Case C-418/01, IMS Health v. NDC Health, 2004 E.C.R. 1-5039.
44 Case C-7/9, Bronner v. Mediaprint, 1998 E.C.R. 1-7791.
45 Microsoft, 2007 E.C.R. at 11-64.
46 Id.
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creation of new products. These three conditions are highly speculative and
allow significant latitude for interpretation.
The Commission argued that these considerations were moot because
remedying the abuse of a dominant position would make it necessary to
infringe on Microsoft's property rights. Nor would IP rights justify withholding
technology from competitors. Since failure to provide the necessary
information to competitors was an abuse of a dominant position, the
Commission was indifferent to whether or not that information was the
company's intellectual property.47 The Court noted in its decision that
interoperability in the software industry was "a matter to which the Community
legislature attaches particular importance.
' 48
By broadening the conditions under which IP can be classified as essential
facilities, the Court's decision erodes IP rights. Competing firms have equal
access to ideas and scientific talent. This suggests that competitors have the
capability to generate similar inventions, which would contradict the assertion
that IP constituted essential facilities. A consistent application of the essential
facilities doctrine would require a demonstration that the investment required to
create such innovations was too costly for potential competitors, although such
a showing was not made in this case.
The Court weighed the question of whether a refusal to supply IP
constituted an abuse of a dominant position. The main issue was whether
exceptional circumstances existed as in Magill and IMS Health. An abuse
existed if the IP was "indispensable" for competitors, in other words, the Court
applied the concept of "essential facilities." The Court based its decision on
Microsoft's high market share in PC operating systems, not server operating
systems. The Court emphasized the need for interoperability between servers
and clients, not between servers.49 The Court argued that customers would
adopt the Windows server operating system to work with Windows PC clients,
even if the customer otherwise preferred the features of competitors' server
software. 50 The Court's reasoning is thus inconsistent with its conclusion that
the Windows server technology is essential.
In evaluating whether Windows server technology was essential, the
Court dismissed the existence of multiple competing server operating systems.
The Court pointed out that Microsoft's market share had increased in
comparison to that of its competitors Solaris, Netware, Unix, and Linux. The
Court further considered whether Microsoft's server technology eliminated
competition, again based on outcomes not conduct. The Court thus based its
decision on Microsoft's market share in server operating systems as well as in
47 Id. at 11-53-57.
48 Id. at 11-62.
49 Id. at 11-76.
50 Id. at 11-82.
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PC operating systems. This demonstrates that market outcomes rather than
anticompetitive conduct are the basis of Microsoft v. Commission.
The Commission limited its market definition of server operating systems
to those for a "small or medium-sized network."5 1 The Court supported the
Commission's definition of the relevant market based on demand-side and
supply-side substitutability. The Court dismissed the evidence that companies
with large networks employ multiple servers of different types, including
mainframes. The Court distinguished between a company's activities that are
mission critical and those that are not, with a corresponding assignment to
larger-scale and smaller-scale servers. The Court buttressed its market
definition by observing that Windows Server 2000 was available in multiple
editions targeted at different market segments: Standard, Enterprise,
Datacenter, and Web. The Court's support for the Commission's supply-side
analysis of the market followed from its having already restricted the demand-
side definition.
The Court's support of the distinct markets view is misguided. The use of
diverse servers within a network is important since servers are substitutes in
delivering services. Restricting attention to servers for smaller networks
narrows the market definition in a manner that ignores customer decision-
making. It should not matter that larger servers and smaller servers tend to
handle different tasks within a network. The multiple capabilities make them
effective substitutes for users. Market segmentation does not imply separate
markets. Such segmentation supports the substitutability of the different types
of servers. The fact that multiple servers are linked within a customer's IT
network demonstrates that users can substitute small and large servers to
deliver a variety of services. Thus, the Court's market definition seems
artificially designed to identify a dominant position for Microsoft in a category
of servers. This incorrect market definition also underlies the Court's view that
elements of Microsoft's technology were essential facilities necessary for
competition and innovation in servers.
The Court's competition analysis is logically inconsistent. Microsoft's
dominance is said to be confined to a submarket of servers, namely servers for
smaller work groups. If this were so, Microsoft's products could only survive
in this market niche if its servers were fully interoperable since most companies
operate networks with different types of servers. However, the Court found that
Microsoft's failure to supply interoperability was an abuse of its dominant
position in the market niche. Either Microsoft's server software is confined to
this niche, in which case it must fully interoperate with that of competitors, or
its position is not confined to this niche, in which case it competes within the
larger market where it is not dominant. Although the Court tried to have it both
ways, in fact Microsoft's server software competed within a larger market
51 Id. at I1-91.
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which was the proper definition of the server software market. Moreover, its
products were fully interoperable with those of its competitors.
The Court made clear that it viewed particular elements of intellectual
property as essential facilities. The Court noted that "the protocols whose
specifications Microsoft is required to disclose in application of the contested
decision represent only a minimum part of the entire set of protocols
implemented in Windows work group server operating systems." 52 Armed with
this information, Microsoft's competitors would not just reproduce the
company's technology, they would improve upon it and offer differentiated
products.
5 3
The Court found that Microsoft "did not sufficiently establish that if it
were required to disclose the interoperability information that would have a
significant negative impact on its incentives to innovate." 54 To prove its case
would require "specifying the technologies or products to which it thus
referred." 55 By its very nature, however, innovation involves as yet unknown
technologies and products. For a firm to show that disclosing IP would reduce
its incentive to innovate, the Court imposed the impossible requirement of
identifying what future inventions would not occur.
The Court rejected the claim that the Commission required disclosure of
technology that went far beyond Sun's original request. Perhaps most
surprisingly, the Court found it to be "irrelevant" that the requested technology
was still under development.5 6 For the Court, a company's "special
responsibility" extends to disclosure of IP even before it has been developed. In
addition, the Court found that the "special responsibility" extends to accepting
reduced incentives to produce future IP, even if the technologies and products
are not yet known.
B. Windows Media Player
Upholding the Commission's charge of "abuse of a dominant position,"
the Court found that Microsoft had tied its Media Player to its Windows
operating system for PCs. The Court argued that streaming media players and
the operating system are separate products and that consumers did not have the
option of purchasing Windows without Media Player. The Commission sought
to unbundle the Media Player application software from the Windows
operating system. This charge was similar to the U.S. Department of Justice
52 Id. at 11-122.
53 Id. ("Once they are able to use the information communicated to them to develop systems
that are sufficiently interoperable with the Windows domain architecture, they will have no other choice,
if they wish to take advantage of a competitive advantage over Microsoft and maintain a profitable
presence on the market, than to differentiate their products from Microsoft's products with respect to
certain parameters and certain features.").
54 Id. at 11-128.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 11-137.
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(DOJ) case involving bundling of the Web browser Internet Explorer with the
Windows operating system.
57
1. The Court's Network Effects Theory
The Court asserted that because Media Player is already installed on
most Windows PCs, which constitute a large share of the market,
competition in media players would be foreclosed. The Commission relied
on "indirect network effects" arguments based on questionable economic
analysis. An "indirect network effect" refers to the effect of prices and features
of complementary goods on a consumer's benefit from the network good.
Liebowitz and Margolis demonstrate that such effects are handled by the
market for complementary goods and therefore cannot be considered as
"externalities." 58 The costs and benefits of the complementary goods are
internalized in market transactions.
In the present instance, the network goods were the media players and the
complementary goods were various types of content. The demand for a media
player might reflect not only the features of the player but also the content that
was available that conformed to the media player's format. Media players are
differentiated products available without charge over the Internet. Consumers
have an incentive to obtain one or more media players to benefit from their
functionality and ability to play particular content.
The Commission's argument was that the ubiquitous presence of Media
Player would discourage the creation and distribution of content in other
formats. As a consequence, the Commission argued that competing
providers of media players would be foreclosed since there would be no
content in their format. The Court endorsed the "indirect network effects"
theory. 59
Assume for purposes of argument that indirect network effects theory is
economically meaningful. Even so, the Commission's argument was fatally
flawed. If content drives adoption of the media players, attractive content in
a particular format would drive the adoption of a media player in that
format. Content providers can count on consumers adopting a media player
to have access to their content, even if media players were costly. In
57 See U.S. v. Microsoft Corp. 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
58 See Stan J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Network Externality: An Uncommon
Tragedy, 8 J. OF ECON. PERSPECTIVES 133 n.2 (1994) (pointing out that the argument that indirect
network effects represent an "externality" repeats conceptual errors in Pigou's "pecuniary externality"
concept); see also Stan J. Liebowitz, & Stephen E. Margolis, Network Effects, in I HANDBOOK OF
TELECOMMUNICATION ECONOMICS 76 (M. E. Cave et al. eds., 2002). On bundling, see Stan J.
Liebowitz, & Stephen E. Margolis, Bundles of Joy: The Ubiquity and Efficiency of Bundles in New
Technology Markets (Northwestern Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper, 2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract = 1069421.
59 Microsoft, 2007 E.C.R. at II-191.
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practice, most major content providers offer consumers links to download
the necessary media player.
The Commission wanted it both ways. Microsoft's Media Player would
drive content providers to adopt their standard. Assume that this assertion is
correct. If that were so, would not the attractive features of competing media
players likewise drive content providers to adopt their competing standards?
The Commission's illogical argument must assume that Windows
Media Player is somehow exceptional-that it influences content providers
in a way that no other media player does. The Court signed on to this view:
"consumers have an incentive to use Windows Media Player at the
expense of competing media players, notwithstanding that the latter
players are of better quality." 60 This requires consumers to be so irrational
that they would pass up a better alternative even though it is available for
free and with the ease of one click of a mouse. As it happens, consumers
adopted competing media players, whether for their functionality or for their
access to content. The fatal flaws in the Court's arguments were confirmed
by the inaccuracy of their predictions.
The Court's decision and that of the Commission have little connection to
events in the marketplace. There was no showing that consumers were harmed
by Microsoft's offering Media Player or by its server software. Rather,
Microsoft's products enjoyed consumer support within the EU. The
proliferation of competing media players, from RealNetworks' Real Player to
Apple's QuickTime, clearly demonstrated that Microsoft's Media Player was
only one option among many available to consumers. 61 Competing media
players were available as free downloads from the Internet. Interestingly, the
Commission acknowledged that other players were popular with consumers
and widely available in the marketplace. The competing players were installed
on PCs by original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) and widely distributed by
software developers and by content providers. This was presented only as
evidence that Windows and Media Player formed a bundle of distinct products.
The Commission predicted that Microsoft's Media Player would dominate
other forms of players on the basis of flawed arguments about "network
effects. 62 Their argument was that because Windows was a dominant
operating system it would create an unfair advantage for Media Player. Content
providers would provide all of their content in the Media Player format. An
absence of content would lead to the demise of all other players because they
had different formats. Not surprisingly the prediction proved to be wildly
60 Id. at 11-174.
61 These included MusicMatch's Jukebox and Nullsoft's Winamp Media Player.
62 See Daniel F. Spulber, Consumer Coordination in the Small and in the Large: Implications
for Antitrust in Markets with Network Effects, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON., (forthcoming June 2008);
Daniel F. Spulber, Unlocking Technology: Innovation and Antitrust, J. OF COMPETITION L. & TECH.
(forthcoming 2008).
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inaccurate, with the rise of Adobe Flash Player, Apple iTunes, and other
market alternatives.
2. The Court's Product Definitions
The Commission argued that Microsoft's Windows operating system and
its Media Player were separate products. It further maintained that Microsoft
had "tied" Media Player to Windows without giving customers the option of
purchasing Windows without also receiving Media Player. The Commission
further maintained that Microsoft was dominant in the market for the tying
product, Windows, and that the tie foreclosed competition in media players
based on the theory of "network effects."
All products are to one extent or another bundles of features,
functionalities, and components. Companies choose to assemble these bundles
to form products based on competition with rival products, customer
preferences over combinations of features, and transaction cost savings from
offering convenience to customers. Companies frequently bundle together both
complementary products (cameras and film) and substitute products
(assortments of teas).
The Court pointed out that Windows is system software and Media Player
is application software. This distinction has no economic content. An
automobile is a similar bundle of components-a tire is not the same thing as a
radio and there are separate individual markets for tires and radios. However,
most consumers would prefer to buy a car that has tires and a radio. The
unbundled version of Windows, without Media Player, proved to have
63
practically no market demand. The Court argued that "any doubts as to the
effectiveness of the remedy ordered by the Commission do not in
themselves prove that its finding as to the existence of two separate
products is wrong."
64
63 See Scott Bekker, Windows XP N Stands for "No Sales ", REDMONDMAG.COM, Oct. 7,
2005, http://redmondmag.com; see also Press Release, Microsoft, Fact Sheet: Windows XP N Sales
(April 24, 2006), available at http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/legal/european/04-24-
06windowsxpnsalesfs.mspx ("XP N sales represent 0.005 percent (1/20,000th of one percent) of overall
XP sales in Europe; No PC manufacturers have ordered or preinstalled Windows XP N on PCs; Only
1,787 copies of Windows XP N have been sold to retailers and distributors in Europe; The number of
copies actually purchased by consumers is not tracked; many may still be sitting on store shelves. The
French retailer FNAC, the single largest retailer to order XP N representing 46% of the orders, has
stated that it sees no consumer demand for Windows XP N; By comparison, 35.5 million copies of the
fully functional version of Windows XP were sold in Europe during the same nine-month period.");
Nicholas Economides, The EU Microsoft Antitrust Case, THE ONLINE MAG. FOR GLOBAL COMPETITION
POLICY, Sept. 20, 2007, http://www.globalcompetitionpolicy.org/index.php?=&action=907&id=542
(stating that Windows-N sales were less than one percent of Windows sales, according to Microsoft).
64 Microsoft, 2007 E.C.R. at 11-169.
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3. Abusive Tying and Contracts with Original Equipment
Manufacturers
The Court's understanding of foreclosure established a very low
standard for abusive tying: competitors must be indistinguishable from
incumbents. The Court found that the availability of multiple media
players on their PCs would "confuse" consumers. Consumers would find
it "complicated" to download competing media players from the Internet.
Consumers would believe mistakenly that a preinstalled player would
"work better" than one that they installed themselves. Consumer decisions
would be held back by "inertia."
65
Microsoft's contracts with OEMs did not restrict their ability to install
competing media players or require them to promote Media Player. Nor did
Windows limit the full interoperability of other media players. Microsoft
provided technical information needed for interoperability to software and
content developers. Most OEMs in fact installed RealPlayer and QuickTime,
often installing two or more media players. Despite this, the Commission
argued that its foreclosure arguments took into account the "likely
reactions" of customers and competitors. For the Commission, simply
offering Media Player as a free functionality took away the free choice of
consumers. 66 Such reasoning is highly questionable since it has no limits.
All functionalities of any product bundle in any industry could be
construed as taking away the free choice of consumers. Firms identified as
dominant cannot offer bundles of features-and thus cannot engage in
normal business.
The Court's conclusion was that Microsoft's "abusive tying" had the
"inevitable consequence" of "appreciably altering the balance of
competition in favour of Microsoft and to the detriment of the other
operators." By being bundled with Windows, the Court asserted, Media
Player "automatically achieved a level of market penetration
corresponding to that of the Windows client PC operating system and
did so without having to compete on the merits with competing
products. ' 67 The Court rejected cost efficiency justifications for bundling.
The Court found that bundling would also deter innovation by
competitors. 68 These conclusions were inconsistent both with market
realities and with economic analysis that finds tying unlikely to foreclose
competition.
69
65 Id. at 11-185-86.
66 Id. at 11-181 (citing Case T-65/98, Van den Bergh Foods v. Comm'n, 2003 E.C R. 11-
4653).
67 Id. at 11-185-86.
68 Id. at 11-196.
69 See Liebowitz & Margolis, Bundles of Joy, supra note 58.
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II. The Court's Treatment of IP Rights Diminishes the Incentive to Innovate
Microsoft v. Commission raises important questions regarding the
interplay between the objectives of competition policy and intellectual property
rights. Achieving the objectives of an efficient competition policy does not
require restriction of IP rights. Promoting competition requires innovative
efficiency. Competition policy that results in an erosion of IP rights will
diminish incentives to innovate and reduce competition. This Section presents
the argument that protection of IP rights is necessary to preserve companies'
incentive to innovate. The discussion establishes that Microsoft v. Commission
represents a substantial reduction of IP rights. The resulting dynamic effects of
the decision will be to reduce incentives to innovate.
A. IP Rights Are Essential to Preserving the Incentive to Innovate
Producing either a public good or a private good requires resources, such
that both types of goods are in scarce supply. A public good by definition has
two features that distinguish it from a private good.70 First, a public good
exhibits "non-rivalrous" consumption. If two consumers wish to consume a
private good such as a cake, they must divide it in some way. Consuming the
services of durable private goods such as an automobile not only involves wear
and tear but only one consumer at a time can drive the car. In contrast, many
consumers can enjoy the same information or the same broadcasted
entertainment without interfering with each other's consumption.
Second, a public good exhibits "non-excludable" consumption. Making
the good available to one consumer makes it available to all. As a consequence,
the unit cost of distributing the good to one consumer is the same as
distributing the good to many consumers. A broadcast can be received by
everyone within the broadcast area. If producers cannot limit access to the
good, consumers may have an incentive to free ride on the consumption of
others.
Intellectual property is different from a public good. IP shares the non-
rivalrous feature of public goods but unlike public goods, IP is excludable.
Intellectual property includes scientific works protected by patents, creative
works protected by copyright, brand names and symbols protected by
trademarks, and trade secrets protected by contract and by statute. Trade secrets
are technical and business information with economic value.
Intellectual products must be excludable to be regarded as property.
Armen A. Alchian defines property rights as having three basic features: "(1)
exclusivity of rights to the choice of use of a resource, (2) exclusivity of rights
to the services of a resource, and (3) rights to exchange the resource at
70 P. A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REv. OF ECON. & STAT. 387,
387-89 (1954).
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mutually agreeable terms." 71 All three features of property rights involve
exclusion in some form. For an intellectual product to be considered IP, the
three features of property rights must apply. Its owner must have exclusive
rights to the choice of how to use the intellectual product. Its owner must have
exclusive rights to the services of the intellectual product. Its owner must have
the rights to transfer ownership of the intellectual product.
Removing any of these features of property rights from an intellectual
product would make that product non-excludable. Since intellectual products
are non-rivalrous in nature, making them non-excludable as well converts them
to public goods. Competition policy that infringes on the rights of owners of IP
thus converts the IP to a public good. Although the intellectual product itself
may retain its economic value to society, such policies represent a taking of
private property by government.
Competition policy that mandates access to an intellectual product
necessarily infringes on property rights. Hence mandating access to IP destroys
intellectual property rights. Mandatory licensing eliminates all three features of
property rights for intellectual products. Mandatory licensing restricts the
decisions of the owner regarding how to use the intellectual product.
Mandatory licensing also restricts the exclusive use of the services of the
intellectual product. Finally, mandatory licensing and accompanying
restrictions that limit royalties or require "reasonable" royalties restrict the
owner's right to sell the intellectual product at mutually agreed upon terms.
Public policymakers are tempted to infringe on IP rights because it
appears desirable to convert intellectual products from private goods to public
goods. It appears to be a public benefit to release intellectual goods from
private ownership, thereby conferring on everyone the benefits of non-rivalrous
consumption. Eliminating exclusiveness seems tempting because what was
privately owned becomes freely available. Policymakers may believe that
public welfare is enhanced by conferring the benefits of intellectual property on
society. Government takings of intellectual property appear to some
policymakers as less egregious than takings of physical property.
Some scholars have argued that intellectual property is fundamentally
different than physical property. Lawrence Lessig argues that the "IP regime"
consisting of patents and copyrights has expanded beyond what is justifiable.
"The restrictions it imposes are artificial, in the sense that they don't promote
progress, they simply benefit one person at the expense of another., 72 For
Lessig, weakening IP rights assures the future of ideas because "free content
fuels innovation." 73 However, the information commons raises problems. An
71 Armen A. Alchian, Property Rights, CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECON.,
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/PropertyRights.html.
72 LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED
WORLD 217 (2001).
73 Id. at 265.
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information commons creates incentives to free ride while reducing incentives
to create new intellectual products.
Competition policy should be guided by considerations of economic
efficiency. Mandating access to IP through forced licensing or other means
eliminates the owner's property rights. Therefore, mandating access to IP
removes the beneficial aspects of property rights for intellectual products. As
with any other resource, private property rights are the foundation of efficient
markets. Private property rights to a resource allow markets to achieve
allocative efficiency since markets allocate the resource to its highest value use.
Private property rights to a resource allow markets to achieve dynamic
efficiency. Dynamic efficiency refers to the efficient allocation of resources
over time, particularly to efficient investment decisions. Individuals will invest
in developing a resource only if they expect to benefit from their investment,
through controlling the use of the resource, obtaining its services, and being
able to exchange the resource in the marketplace.
For intellectual products, it is important to add innovative efficiency to the
standard criteria of allocative and dynamic efficiency. Innovative efficiency
refers to efficient allocation of resources to inventive and innovative activity.
Inventive activity involves allocation of resources to R&D and the choice
among uncertain projects based on expected benefits, costs, and risks.
Innovative activity involves the commercialization of inventions and decisions
about new products, manufacturing processes, and transaction methods.
Government policies, such as antitrust regulation, that substantially alter
incentives to innovate are likely to reduce innovative efficiency.
Innovative efficiency contains elements of allocative efficiency and
dynamic efficiency. Effective markets for technology allocate intellectual
property to the highest value users. With dynamic efficiency, firms make
efficient investments in research, development, and commercialization of new
technology. In addition, innovative efficiency requires that firms choose to bear
the risks of exploring new areas and act creatively in the commercialization of
new technologies. Effective protections for intellectual property are essential
for innovation efficiency. Without such protections, finms may favor more
incremental or replicative inventions than they would otherwise. Also, firms
may be reluctant to commercialize some of their discoveries that will trigger
competition policy actions that reduce their IP rights. Firms may delay or
disguise their innovations to reduce government scrutiny and takings of their
IP.
Mandated access to intellectual products takes many forms. A
classification framework developed for access to networks can be adapted to
examine access to intellectual products. 74 The access framework adapts readily
74 See Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Network Regulation: The Many Faces of
Access, 1 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 635 (2005); see also DANIEL F. SPULBER & CHRISTOPHER S.
Yoo, NETWORKS IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS: ECONOMICS AND LAW (forthcoming 2008) (discussing
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to intellectual products. Retail access to intellectual products is provided
through licensing to final customers, while wholesale access and unbundled
access are provided through licensing to competitors. Unbundled access to
intellectual products is provided by licensing and disclosure of information that
is an element or component of an intellectual product. Platform access means
that the intellectual products conform to a technological standard that allows
other companies to provide complementary services. Platform access to
intellectual products that is available to any and all suppliers of complements
constitutes open access, such as open source software. Finally, interconnection
access for intellectual products refers to reciprocal interoperability agreements.
The classification framework for access to IP is useful for understanding
Microsoft v. Commission. The case entails three main forms of access:
unbundled, platform, and interconnection. Perhaps most significantly, the case
requires unbundled access to IP since Microsoft was required to supply
information about a software element to its competitors in server software,
namely Active Directory. Also, unbundled access involved compulsory
licensing of technology to open source software developers. The case required
platform access since Microsoft had to supply technology licenses and provide
compatibility to providers of complementary services, particularly
manufacturers of servers. The case also involved interconnection access
through interoperability agreements with competitors.
Consumption of intellectual products is non-rivalrous since usage does not
deplete inventions, as already noted. Access to intellectual property is
rivalrous, however, because usage depletes the IP's economic returns.
Mandating access to IP eliminates the ability of original owners to control how
they are used or to benefit from market transactions. In this way, regulated
access to IP is closely related to access to networks. Regulated networks for
telecommunications, transmission, and transportation are composed of physical
and virtual facilities. These facilities have scarce capacity so that consumption
of the services of these facilities is rivalrous. The costs of granting competitors
access to scarce facilities include the opportunities foregone by the owner of
those facilities. Regulating access to IP depletes their scarce economic value,
dispersing economic rents among competing users. In the same way, the costs
of licensing IP to competitors include the economic opportunities foregone by
the owners of the IP.
As a consequence, mandating access to IP reduces incentives to innovate
in two ways. First, any firm in the industry will have reduced incentives to
that there are five main types of access: (1) retail access, (2) wholesale access, (3) unbundled access, (4)
platform access, and (5) interconnection access. Retail access is provided to final customers, while
wholesale access and unbundled access are provided to competitors. Platform access means that the
network facilities conform to a standard that allows other companies to provide complementary services.
Platform access that is available to any and all suppliers of complements constitutes open access.
Interconnection access refers to reciprocal connection agreements between networks that provide access
to each other's facilities, forming a larger network in the process); Spulber & Yoo, Mandating Access to
Telecom and the Internet The Hidden Side of Trinko, supra note 39.
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innovate since any successful innovation risks triggering antitrust action. In
addition to fines and legal costs, the firm faces the possibility that regulators
will give competitors access to its IP. Second, competitors of the firm that
grants access to its IP will have less incentive to innovate since they will
receive access to the innovation without any innovative effort. The possibility
of free riding will lower incentives to innovate for all firms. With reduced
incentives to innovate, firms will choose to compete along other competitive
dimensions such as pricing, marketing, sales, and complementary services.
B. Effects of Microsoft v. Commission on IP Rights and the Incentive to
Innovate
Microsoft v. Commission is closely related to other Article 82 cases that
came before the Court of Justice of the European Communities (ECJ) and the
Court of First Instance. 75 Several of these cases established precedents in the
area of intellectual property. The ECJ found in Magill that the BBC, RTE, and
ITV abused their dominant market position by not licensing their copyright to
their television program listings to an independent publisher. 76 The ECJ found
subsequently in IMS Health that IMS abused a dominant position by not
providing access to a copyrighted database method used in pharmaceutical
sales. These cases established the notion that failure to provide IP was
exclusionary behavior.7
In contrast, the ECJ found in Volvo v. Veng that Volvo did not abuse its
dominant position when it would not license its designs for auto body panels to
a parts supplier. The ECJ stated that a refusal to grant a license to a protected
design was not in itself abuse of a dominant position, and forced licensing even
at a reasonable royalty would deprive the owner of the IP the "very subject-
matter of his excusive right."78
Microsoft v. Commission extends the approach to IP taken in Magill and
IMS Health, while rejecting the limitations of Volvo v. Veng. The Commission
ordered Microsoft "to disclose interoperability information for the development
of interoperable products." 79 This Commission's stated objective was "to
ensure that Microsoft's competitors can develop products that interoperate with
75 These cases include Case C-418/01, IMS Health v. NDC Health, 2004 E.C.R. 1-5039; Case
C-551/03 P, General Motors BV v. Comm'n, 2006 E.C.R. 1-3173; Case C-7/9, Bronner v. Mediaprint,
1998 E.C.R. 1-7791; Joined Cases C-241/91 P & C-242/91 P, RTE & ITP v. Comm'n, 1995 E.C.R. 1-
743; Case 238/87, AB Volvo v. Erik Veng, Ltd., 1988 E.C.R. 6211; Case 311/84, CBEM v. CLT & IPB,
1985 E.C.R. 3261; Case 27/76, United Brands Co. & United Brands Continental BV v. Comm'n, 1978
E.C.R. 207; Case 102/77, Hoffmann-La Roche v. Centrafarm, 1978 E.C.R. 1139; Joined Cases 6/73 &
7/73, Commercial Solvents v. Comm'n, 1974 E.C.R. 223; Joined Cases T-125/03 & T-253/03, Akzo
Nobel Chem. Ltd. v. Comm'n, 2007 O.J. (C269/43); and Case C-205/03 P, Federaci6n Espafiola de
Empresas de Tecnologia Sanitaria (FENIN) v. Comm'n, 2006 O.J. (C212/1).
76 Joined Cases C-241/91 P & C-242/91 P, RTE & ITP v. Comm'n, 1995 E.C.R. 1-743, 1-825.
77 Case C-418/01, IMS Health v. NDC Health, 2004 E.C.R. 1-5039, 1-5087-88.
78 Case 238/87, AB Volvo v. Erik Veng, Ltd., 1988 E.C.R. 6211, 6235.
79 Commission Decision, supra note 1, at 277.
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the Windows domain architecture . . . and hence viably compete with
Microsoft's work group server operating system."80 The order goes on to
require that Microsoft not only disclose specifications but also authorize its
competitors to implement the specifications in work group server operating
system products. 8' The Commission's decision reduces existing legal
protections for intellectual property. As a consequence, the resulting
competition policy may be expected to impact adversely innovative efficiency
in markets for technology.
The Commission's decision turns on the meaning of a single critical word:
interoperability. For its definition, the Commission cites the "Software
Directive":
Whereas the function of a computer program is to communicate and work
together with other components of a computer system and with users and, for
this purpose a logical and, where appropriate, physical interconnection and
interaction is required to permit all elements of software and hardware to work
with other software and hardware and with users in all the ways in which they
are intended to function;
Whereas the parts of the program which provide for such interconnection and
interaction between elements of software and hardware are generally known as
'interfaces';
Whereas this functional interconnection and interaction is generally known as
'interoperability'; whereas such interoperability can be defined as the ability to
exchange information and mutually to use the information which has been
exchanged.
82
The Commission stated that, "[i]n any case, the issue at stake in this case
is ultimately the question whether, pursuant to Article 82 of the Treaty,
Microsoft provides to its competitors in the work group server operating
system market the interoperability information that it has a special
responsibility to provide." 83
The Software Directive's definition of interoperability is suitably general
for developing an intuitive understanding of computer systems. Problems arise,
however, when the definition is applied as a characterization of intellectual
property. The problem is that all computers are information processing devices.
Computers exchange information and process that information both internally
and externally. Internally, computers move and process data and manage
interaction between software and hardware. Externally, computer networks
move and process data and manage interaction between multiple types of
80 Id. at 278.
81 Id.
82 Council Directive 91/250/EEC of 14 May 1991 on the Legal Protection of Computer
Programs, 1991 O.J. (L122) 42, 42-46 (EC).
83 Commission Decision, supra note 1, at 12.
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software elements, multiple types of computers, and peripheral equipment such
as printers.
Interoperability, thus defined, is practically everything that computers do.
Applying the Software Directive as a definition of intellectual property would
extend protections to practically all functional interconnection and interaction
within a firm's computer products, both hardware and software. This might be
viewed as an overly extensive definition of IP that could prevent the
development of standards for interoperability of products offered by different
firms.
Conversely, applying the Software Directive as a means of identifying
information that a firm should disclose would remove practically all IP
protections. Requiring firms to disclose almost all functional interconnection
and interaction to competitors would represent the end of IP in information
technology markets.
The Commission acknowledged that interoperability is a matter of
degree. 84 The spectrum of possibilities presumably extends between full IP
protections to complete disclosure of information without any IP protections.
Microsoft argued that the Commission's charge of abuse of dominance would
upset the "careful balance between copyright and competition policies" struck
by the Software Directive. 85 The Commission responded that this balance could
be changed because competition policy under Article 82 superseded copyright
policy under the Software Directive.86 The Commission argued that, in any
case, the Software Directive "limits a copyright-holder's rights in favour of
interoperability, whether the copyright-holder is dominant or not." 87 Adding in
Microsoft's dominant market position, the decision "establishes that Microsoft
has an obligation to actively supply interface information to other work group
server operating system vendors."
88
The question is where does operation of a software program end, and
where does interoperation of distinct software programs begin? Interoperability
allows distinct computers and software programs to work together, even when
they are provided by different firms. The Commission's definition goes far
beyond interconnection and interaction, however. Its view of interoperability
requires sufficient disclosure of IP such that a firm's program must interact
with a competitor's program with all available functionalities. 89 In practice,
accomplishing such "full interoperability" essentially eliminates product
differentiation. To achieve such full interoperability likely requires some
disclosure of the source code of the initial program. The competitor can
appropriate all the information to construct a nearly identical program that
84 Commission Decision, supra note 1, at 12.
85 Id. at 199 (citing Microsoft submission of Nov. 17, 2000, Annex Y on page 1).
86 Id.
87 Id. at 199.
88 Id. at 200 (emphasis in original).
89 Id. at 140.
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functions in the same way. Interoperability becomes a justification for
compelling disclosure of information, including a firm's product innovation.
The Commission's competition policy influenced the IT marketplace.
This is evidenced by the relationship between Microsoft and Sun. In 2004,
Microsoft and Sun formed a ten-year business and technology alliance.
Microsoft paid two billion dollars to Sun, which dropped its U.S. antitrust suit
against Microsoft. The Sun-Microsoft alliance was extended in September
2007 when Sun agreed to resell and install Windows on some of its servers.
These were servers based on Intel's x86 and Xeon microprocessors and on
Advanced Micro Devices's (AMD) Opteron microprocessors. The deal did not
yet extend to Sun's servers based on its SPARC microprocessors, which were
the majority of Sun's sales.
90
Beginning in 2004, Sun and Microsoft had worked together on Internet
services, particularly interoperability between Microsoft's .Net System and
Sun's Java technology.9 1 The alliance also served customers who used both
Windows and Solaris, Sun's operating system software for managing databases
and e-commerce. 92 Each company's operating system would function using the
other company's "virtualization" software, which is a technique for
simultaneously running multiple operating systems on the same computer.
93
Sun, whose software is Unix-based, benefited from the alliance by gaining a
competitive response to the open-source Unix-based Linux software.
Sun stated that the 2004 agreement would "satisfy the objectives" of its
European Commission complaint against Microsoft.94 Sun's licensing of
Windows communications protocols followed terms established under the U.S.
Department of Justice consent decree. The agreement required the resolution of
complex IP issues, because both companies held many patents for their
respective technologies, including patents on proprietary communications
protocols required for interoperability between .Net and Java. 95 Microsoft's
lead attorney Brad Smith speculated that Microsoft's agreement with Sun
"underscores our commitment to achieve interoperability," adding that "I think
the European case has a life of its own."
96




93 Christopher Lawton & Don Clark, Sun is Warming Up to Windows, WALL ST. J., Sept. 13,
2007, at B4.
94 Stephen Shankland, Sun Settles with Microsoft, Announces Layoffs, Apr. 2, 2004, CNET
NETWORKS, http://www.news.com/2100-1014-3-5183848.html.
95 Stephen Shankland & Ina Fned, Settling Down?, Oct. 12, 2004, CNET NETWORKS,
http://www.news.cornSettling-down/2008-1014_3-5184274.html.
96 Id. Smith further observed that "I don't think that the fundamental dynamic of the case is
going to change, because it is now the European Commission that is proceeding, and they'll make up
their own minds, based on their own assessment of the situation."
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These marketplace developments illustrate the effects of Microsoft v.
Commission on firms' incentives to innovate. These effects are not specific to
Microsoft or Sun and they transcend the IT industry. Because of the importance
of the European market and the ability of the EU to serve as a forum for
complaints and legal action, the dynamic effects of the decision are not limited
to the EU. Companies worldwide have greater incentives to cooperate and
reduced incentives to compete. Companies face increased incentives to obtain
technology from competitors and reduced incentives to develop new
technology.
Because of the significant erosion of IP rights for successful companies,
the returns to investment in R&D are diminished for all companies. The returns
for successful companies are eroded because these companies face the
prospects of legal challenges with the accompanying legal costs and public
relations problems. If they are found to have abused their dominant market
position by not licensing their technology voluntarily to competitors, these
companies face financial penalties and compulsory licensing. At a minimum
successful companies that do business in Europe will weigh these risks in
deciding whether or not to invest in product and process R&D. If successful
companies happen to have made scientific and technical discoveries, these
companies will weigh the risks in deciding whether or not to commercialize
these discoveries.
Successful companies will not just compare the costs of R&D with the
financial benefits of R&D. They will instead discount the benefits of R&D by
taking into account the likelihood that they will need to give away the IP. The
companies will then subtract the potential costs of litigation and fines
associated with mandated licensing. Successful companies will take into
account the additional payments they will need to make to competitors that
pursue antitrust litigation by taking their complaints to the European
Commission. These considerations certainly will impact R&D projects whose
net benefits would be positive but close to the margin of acceptable projects.
The result will be fewer resources devoted to R&D, resulting in less
innovation. This should raise concerns because successful companies are those
most likely to have substantial R&D budgets and are those most likely to have
a portfolio of discoveries. The reduction in innovation will make consumers
worse off throughout the world economy.
Even companies that are nearly successful will be deterred from R&D if a
potential innovation will propel them to the top of their market segment. They
will consider whether the innovation will draw the attention of competition
policy regulators and competitors who might file complaints. The result will be
a desire to remain within the herd rather than seeking to distinguish the firm's
products. This will reduce the incentive to innovate even for firms that do not
have dominant market shares.
Microsoft v. Commission breaks new ground by requiring disclosure of
technology before it is even created. Successful companies have incentives for
Vol. 25:2, 2008
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greater secrecy when competitors can request technology still under
development. Because their competitors can seek regulations that unbundle the
elements of an invention, companies have additional incentives to pursue
defensive R&D strategies that protect their IP from the scrutiny of their
competitors. The result will be less interoperability and reduced
communication of scientific and technical information within industries.
Reduced communication of discoveries and R&D efforts will diminish
incentives to innovate. The end result of eroding IP protections is to change the
nature of innovation. Legal implications rather than scientific and commercial
considerations will guide innovation decisions.
III. The Connection Between International Trade and Innovation
Microsoft v. Commission is much more than competition policy-it is a
complement to European trade policy. The interaction between competition
policy and trade policy is well understood by European policymakers. Neelie
Kroes, European Commissioner for Competition Policy, observed that "An
active EU trade policy-including international discipline on subsidies-is
therefore a necessary complement to internal competition policy."97 According
to Kroes, "European competition and trade policy must act in tandem" to
pursue, among other objectives, "[p]rotecting European consumers and
businesses from the harmful effects of global cartels, monopolies and
restrictive agreements."
98
Kroes recognized that trade restrictions resulting from competition policy
could reduce consumer welfare
Shielding off European companies from competition through artificial entry
barriers is also the wrong approach because put quite simply it will not work.
Companies shielded from competition at home cannot hope to compete abroad.
And it is the domestic customers of those companies that end up paying the
price: less innovative products, less choice, higher prices.
99
Despite these potential welfare effects for consumers, Kroes argued that
competition policy and trade policy should "act in tandem" to protect European
businesses from monopolies. Protecting European businesses from an abuse of
a dominant position not only means protection of competition, but protection of
competitors.
97 Neelie Kroes, European Commissioner for Competition Policy, Speech to the 2nd Lisbon
Conference on Competition Law and Economics in Lisbon: Helping Europeans Get the Best Deal: A
Sound Competition Policy for Well-functioning Markets (Nov. 15, 2007), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/commission barroso/kroes/speeches-en.html.
98 Neelie Kroes, European Commissioner for Competition Policy, Speech at the Women in
European Business Conference in Frankfurt: Global Europe Competing and Cooperating (Oct. 11,
2007), available at http://ec.europa.eu/commissionbarroso/kroes/speechesen.html.
99 Kroes, supra note 97.
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This Section demonstrates how international trade enhances the incentive
to innovate. The discussion shows how the competition policy expressed in
Microsoft v. Commission represents a form of protectionist trade policy. The
potential dynamic effect of such protectionist trade policy is a reduction of the
beneficial effects of international trade on the incentive to innovate.
A. How International Trade Enhances the Incentive to Innovate
International trade interacts in significant ways with the incentive to
innovate. Technology is traded internationally embodied in the form of
innovative products and services as well as in the form of technology licenses.
Adam Smith extolled the benefits of international trade by pointing out that
economies of scale depend on the extent of the market. Paul Krugman found
that by expanding the market, international trade improves product variety.°° I
show elsewhere that by expanding the market, international trade improves the
quality of innovation. 101
International trade widens the extent of the market for inventions and for
innovative products. This increases the size of the pool of R&D experiments
from which the best technology is chosen. Technology trade increases the
efficiency of invention while at the same time lowering the total number of
inventors relative to the equilibrium without technology trade. Technology
trade increases the volume of trade in goods. Technology trade increases
product variety at the market equilibrium. Technology trade increases national
income in each country and increases total gains from trade.
Technology trade increases the expected value of trade in goods between
countries. Technology embodied in the form of products such as computers,
software, consumer electronics, medical equipment, machine tools,
automobiles, and other goods contributes significantly to international trade.
There is much less international trade in technology in the form of IP.
However, international trade in IP is substantial in comparison to R&D
expenditures for countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD). t°2 The growth in technology trade suggests that
100 See Paul R. Krugman, Increasing Returns, Monopolistic Competition, and International
Trade, 9 J. INT'L ECON. 469 (1979).
101 For a theoretical analysis of these issues see Daniel F. Spulber, Innovation and
International Trade in Technology, 138 J. ECON. THEORY 1 (2008) (analyzing the international
technology market and the economic effects of international trade in technology). The discussion in this
Section draws from that article.
102 See ORG. ECON. COOPERATION DEV. (OECD), SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND INDUSTRY
SCOREBOARD 83-90 (2007) (presenting data on the technology balance of payments in OECD
countries). The data covers unaffiliated and affiliated transfers of disembodied technology including
patents (purchases, sales), licenses for patents, know-how (not patented), models and designs, trade-
marks (including franchising), technical services, and finance of industrial R&D outside national
territory. Id. at 199 (showing that the average of technological payments and receipts exceeded 0.5% of
GDP in the OECD countries in 2005). Id. at 24 (stating that domestic R&D expenditures were about
2.2% of GDP in the OECD countries in 2005).
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international technology transfers create potentially significant gains from trade
and that such gains are likely to be distinct from those based on the exchange
of goods and services. Technological knowledge provides demand-side
economies because knowledge can be transferred at relatively low cost and
applied by multiple users. International trade in technology allows multiple
countries to combine R&D efforts and to employ the same innovation.
Countries can achieve gains from trade not only by exchanging products but
also by transferring knowledge.
Technological advances contribute to international trade through
enhanced products and services. In addition, the international market in
disembodied technology includes both arms-length transfers between firms,
such as sales of licenses, and internal transfers within multinational firms.
Research on trade and endogenous growth identifies numerous economic
benefits from international technology transfer.10 3 Economic historians have
long emphasized the importance of the creation and exchange of knowledge in
promoting economic development.1
0 4
The significance of the connection between technology and international
trade is evidenced by increases in the number of R&D laboratories that
multinational corporations choose to locate abroad, with R&D performed
outside of the company's home country.10 5 Companies have established
international networks and alliances for cooperative R&D, some involving
103 See Judith. C. Chin & Gene. M. Grossman, Intellectual Property Rights and North-South
Trade, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 90 (Ronald Jones & Anne Krueger eds.,
1990) (presenting a theoretical analysis in which some countries benefit from international technology
transfer by pirating R&D that originates in other countries); Jonathan Eaton & Samuel S. Kortum,
International Technology Diffusion: Theory and Measurement, 40 INT'L ECON. REV. 537, 537-70
(1991) (presenting a dynamic model of international technology diffusion with endogenous R&D in
which ideas diffuse across countries with an exogenously specified lag and countries then adopt the best
technology. Eaton and Kortum allow inventors to decide on how much to patent in order to capture rents
from invention even though patenting does not affect the rate of diffusion); Luis A. Rivera & Paul M.
Romer, Economic Integration and Endogenous Growth, 106 Q. J. OF ECON. 531, 531-555 (1991)
(showing that economic integration between countries can be achieved by increasing trade in goods or
by increasing the flow of ideas); M. Scott Taylor, Trips, Trade and Growth, 35 INT'L ECON. REV. 361
(1994) (showing in a two-country model the importance of intellectual property protections for
international trade, economic growth, and technology transfer); see also GENE M. GROSSMAN &
ELHANAN HELPMAN, INNOVATION AND GROWTH IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 200-05 (1991) (pointing
out that an innovative firm can license an invention abroad as a means of taking advantage of factor
price differences while avoiding the costs of setting up a plant abroad).
104 See WILLIAM M. LANDES, THE UNBOUND PROMETHEUS: TECHNOLOGICAL AND
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN EUROPE FROM 1750 TO THE PRESENT (1969); NATHAN ROSENBERG,
PERSPECTIVES ON TECHNOLOGY (1976); Moses A. Abramovitz, Catching Up, Forging Ahead and
Falling Behind, 46 J. ECON. HIST. 385, 385-406 (1986).
105 Jeremy Howells, The Internationalization of R&D and the Development of Global
Research Networks, 24 REGIONAL STUD. 495 (1990); OECD, RECENT TRENDS IN THE
INTERNATIONALISATION OF R&D tN THE ENTERPRISE SECTOR (2008), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/27/59/40280783.pdf; David Mowery & David J. Teece, Japan's
Growing Capabilities in Industrial Technology: Implications for U.S. Managers and Policymakers, 35
CAL. MGMT. 9, 9 (1993); Richard Florida & Martin Kenney, The Globalization of Japanese R&D: The
Economic Geography of Japanese R&D Investment in the United States, 70 ECON. GEOGRAPHY 344
(1994).
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governments and universities. The growing international trade in technology is
reflected in strengthened international agreements on intellectual property such
as the World Trade Organization's (WTO) agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and increased patenting of the
same invention in multiple countries to establish patent families.
International trade in technology leads to global competition among
inventors by connecting markets. Inventions are substitutes for each other and
differ in terms of the efficiencies that they provide. 10 6 International trade in
technology has a number of important properties.'0 7 First, when countries
combine innovative efforts through trade, markets choose the best technology
from a combined pool of experiments, making a better technology more likely
than would be obtained from separate sets of experiments.'0 8 International trade
in goods that embody technology or in technology licenses effectively connects
inventors by pooling experiments across countries. By widening the number of
inventors that compete with each other, international trade in technology
improves the expected performance of the best innovation.
Second, technology trade stimulates the entry of inventors, leading to
more total inventors than there were in either country without technology trade
because the rewards of inventors depend on net returns obtained in the
combined markets. Inventors earn returns by selling their inventions in both
countries. However, because pooled invention is more efficient, the total
number of inventors in equilibrium with technology trade is less than the total
number of inventors that enter without technology trade. Thus, technology
trade lowers the total cost of invention while raising the quality of the expected
outcome of invention.
Third, technology trade increases each country's national income by
raising its supply of human capital. Technological change enhances the
productivity of labor, or equivalently the supply of human capital. Technology
trade increases the quality of the best innovation. This increases human capital
relative to R&D without technology trade.
Fourth, technology trade increases the expected value of trade in goods.
The value of trade in goods for each country is equal to its import share of
goods traded. The expectation of the import share is increased because of the
greater efficiency of invention with international trade in technology. Increases
in human capital and reductions in the total costs of invention increase the
value of product trade.
106 The model of competition among inventors in Spulber, supra note 101, is from the classic
work by Arrow in which an inventor is assumed to have a monopoly over his invention. See Kenneth J.
Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in NATIONAL BUREAU OF
ECONOMIC RESEARCH: THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY (1962).
107 These are shown in Spulber, supra note 101.
108 See Richard R. Nelson, Uncertainty, Learning, and the Economics of Parallel Research
and Development Efforts, 43 REV. ECON. & STAT. 351, 363 (1961) (noting the benefits of a larger pool
of inventors).
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Fifth, technology trade increases the expected variety of goods traded in
equilibrium. The international product market is described by a model of
monopolistic competition. The countries trade differentiated products and
derive benefits from intraindustry trade because customers prefer product
variety and there are economies of scale in production. The number of products
produced in each of the two countries and the corresponding level of product
trade depend on the supplies of human capital in the two countries. By
increasing supplies of human capital, technological change increases product
variety.
Finally, international trade in technology creates gains from trade in
comparison to a market equilibrium without technology trade. Technology
trade increases human capital by enhancing the productivity of labor in both
countries. The gains from trading technology enhance the benefits obtained
from trading a greater variety of products than are produced with economies of
scale. Technology trade increases the expected gains from trade by increasing
product variety relative to product trade without international trade in
technology.109 Technology trade improves the expected productivity of labor in
both countries thus increasing product variety. Population growth in either
country can increase gains from trade because population growth increases the
total number of inventors at the market equilibrium with international trade in
technology. Product variety increases and expected gains from trade increase
due to the improved realization of the best technology. This discussion
illustrates how international markets for technology create gains from trade.
Economists have studied the effects of international technology transfer
extensively. Such transfers often are referred to as "spillovers," which can
designate a range of international transfer mechanisms including market-
mediated technology diffusion, human capital mobility, imitation, copying, and
education, training, and scientific exchanges. Some non-market transfers of
technology across countries result from imperfections in international
protections for intellectual property. However, much of international IP
transfers take place through trade in technology that is embodied in goods and
109 See David Hummels & Peter J. Klenow, The Variety and Quality of a Nation's Exports,
95 AM. ECON. REv. 704 (2005) (discussing these gains' contrast with traditional Ricardian comparative
advantage in which trade is driven by productivity differences between countries). In the Ricardian
setting, technology differences result in countries having comparative advantages in goods, so that
specialization in production and exchange of goods generates gains from trade. Hummels, Klenow and
others criticize monopolistic competition models of trade as unrealistic because of the assumption that
all countries consume all goods and the way that country size affects the number of products a country
exports. In a Ricardian model, where international trade takes place due to relative productivity
differences across goods, product-specific innovation that narrows productivity gaps across countries
may reduce the number of goods traded, particularly in the presence of trade costs. However, even in a
Ricardian setting, inventions that increase human capital and thus increase the effective size of the labor
force, yielding neutral technological progress as in the present setting, may still increase the volume of
trade.
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through internal transfers within multinational corporations. 1 0 International
transfers within multinational companies can entail transaction costs.IlI
Empirical results show that productivity is increased by foreign R&D
through various types of spillover effects. Eaton and Kortum examine patenting
and the effects of technology transfer in the OECD. They suggest that in
comparison with growth studies on the effects of technological change on
worker productivity, "Where technological change originates and how it
spreads across countries is less well understood." They point out that other than
the five leading research economies (U.S., Japan, the U.K., Germany, and
France), all other OECD countries obtain over 90 percent of their productivity
growth from ideas that originated abroad. They specify diffusion as rates at
which ideas flow between country pairs and estimate the diffusion parameters
and their effects on economic growth.' 12 Eaton and Kortum extend this analysis
by examining the gradual diffusion of technological advances. In the five
leading research economies, the U.S. and Japan contribute two-thirds or more
to growth, and only the U.S. obtains most of its growth from its own
innovation. 113 The level and composition of international trade in goods is
110 The growth of international markets for technology is reflected in numerous studies of
market transfers of knowledge. See ASHISH ARORA ET AL., MARKETS FOR TECHNOLOGY: THE
ECONOMICS OF INNOVATION AND CORPORATE STRATEGY (2001) (discussing evidence on the existence
of international markets for technology and providing extensive analysis of the chemical industry);
Bharat Anand & Tarun Khanna, The Structure of Licensing Contracts, 48 J. INDUS. ECON. 103 (2000)
(discussing the many international licensing agreements in chemicals, electronics and computers);
Ashish Arora et al., Specialized Technology Suppliers, International Spillovers and Investment:
Evidence from the Chemical Industry, 65 J. DEV. ECON. 31 (2001) (discussing that specialized
engineering firms in the chemical industry play a significant role in market transfers of technology
transfer through engineering consulting services); Lynne M. Zucker et al., Geographically Localized
Knowledge: Spillovers or Markets?, 36 ECON. INQUIRY 65 (1998) (discussing evidence of market-
mediated transfers of biotechnology); see also John E. Tilton, INTERNATIONAL DIFFUSION OF
TECHNOLOGY: THE CASE OF SEMICONDUCTORS (1971); Peter C. Grindley & David J. Teece, Managing
Intellectual Capital. Licensing and Cross-Licensing in Semiconductors and Electronics, 39 CAL.
MGMT. REV. 8 (1997) (discussing licensing in the international diffusion of semiconductors and
electronics).
IlI See David J. Teece, Technology Transfer by Multinational Firms: The Resource Cost of
Transferring Technological Know-How, 87 ECON. J. 242 (1997).
112 See Jonathan Eaton & Samuel Kortum, Trade in Ideas: Patenting and Productivity in the
OECD, 40 J. INT'L ECON. 251 (1996); see also Jonathan Eaton & Samuel Kortum, Technology, Trade,
and Growth: A Unified Framework, in 45 EUROPEAN ECON. RE.: PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS 742
(2001).
113 See Jonathan Eaton & Samuel S. Kortum, International Technology Diffusion. Theory
and Measurement, 40 Int. Econ. Rev. 537 (1999). Additional empirical studies of technology transfer
include Jeffrey I. Bernstein & Pierre Mohnen, International R&D Spillovers Between U.S. and Japanese
R&D-Intensive Sectors, 44 J. INT'L ECON. 315 (1997); David T. Coe & Elhanan Helpman, International
R&D Spillovers, 39 EUROPEAN ECON. REV. 859 (1995); Hans J. Engelbrecht, International R&D
Spillovers, Human Capital and Productivity in OECD Economies: An Empirical Investigation, 41
EUROPEAN ECON. REV. 1479 (1997); Walid Hejazi & A. Edward Safarian, Trade, Foreign Direct
Investment and R&D Spillovers, 30 J. INT'L BUS. STUD. 491 (1999); Pierre Mohnen, International R&D
Spillovers and Economic Growth, in INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, PRODUCTIVITY, AND ECONOMIC
GROWTH: INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE (Matti Pohjola ed., 2001); Bin Xu & Jianmao Wang, Capital
Goods Trade and R&D Spillovers in the OECD, 32 CANADIAN J. OF ECON. 1258 (1999); and Bin Xu &
Jianmao Wang, Trade, Foreign Direct Investment and International Technology Diffusion, 15 J. ECON.
INTEGRATION 585 (2000).
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associated with benefits from technology spillovers. Again, such effects can be
due to market-mediated technology transfers within and between firms. 14
Foreign direct investment (FDI) commonly is identified as a mechanism
for enhanced productivity that is explained as a technology spillover. Increased
FDI may be associated with greater market transfers of knowledge, which
includes internal transfers within multinational corporations, as well as
technology sales by foreign subsidiaries of multinational corporations. FDI
effects on productivity also may indicate movement of human capital from the
subsidiaries of multinational corporations to local companies. FDI effects also
can indicate learning and imitation of th- multinational corporation subsidiary
by local companies. 115 FDI provides a means of internalization of technology
that allows firms to exercise greater control over the transfer and usage of their
technology in comparison with licenses. Mansfield identifies FDI closely with
knowledge transfers, noting that decisions about both FDI and licensing depend
on the extent of international protections for intellectual property.1
16
When international technology transfer is protected by intellectual
property rights, the incentive to invent is likely to increase since companies
obtain rents by selling technology licenses or by employing the technology
with less competition from technology diffusion. When international
technology transfers take place outside of the market, research and
development and product trade generate positive externalities. This potentially
implies economic inefficiency because inventors' efforts only reflect their
private benefits but not the social benefits of invention. To capture the rents
from invention, firms will seek ways to exclude access to their technology so as
to capture these gains through market transfers.
There are various types of intellectual property protections in international
markets. First, intellectual property rights are well recognized within many
national economies and protected through various legal means including
copyrights, trademarks, and patents. Owners of intellectual property can obtain
legal protections in multiple countries, for example inventors can obtain patents
114 See Coe & Helpman, supra note 113; Xu & Wang, Trade, Foreign Direct Investment and
International Technology Diffusion, supra note 113 (finding related import effects from trade in capital
goods); see also Jonathan Eaton & Samuel Kortum, Technology, Geography and Trade, 70
ECONOMETRICA 1741 (2002) (formulating and testing a multi-country Ricardian trade model in which
the benefits of technological innovation are realized through trade in goods rather than trade in
technology itself).
115 For studies of FDI and technology transfer see, e.g., Steven Globerman et al.,
International Technology Diffusion: Evidence From Swedish Patent Data, 53 KYKLOS 17 (2000); Frank
Lichtenberg & Bruno van Pottelsberghe de ]a Potterie, Does Foreign Direct Investment Transfer
Technology Across Borders?, 83 REV. ECON. & STAT. 490 (2001); Bin Xu, Multinational Enterprises,
Technology Diffusion and Host Country Productivity Growth, 62 J. OF DEV. ECON. 477; Xu & Wang,
Trade, Foreign Direct Investment and International Technology Diffusion, supra note 113; and Lee
Branstetter, Is Foreign Direct Investment a Channel of Knowledge Spillovers?" Evidence from Japan's
FDI in the United States (NBER Working Paper No. 8015, 2001).
116 Edwin Mansfield, Intellectual Property Protection, Foreign Direct Investment, and
Technology Transfer (International Finance Corp., World Bank, Discussion Paper No. 19, 1994),
available at http://ifclnl .ifc.org/ifcext/economics.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/dp l9/$FILE/dpl 9.pdf.
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in multiple countries. In the OECD area in 1995 for example, there were
32,000 families of patents, each protecting a single innovation filed at the
European Patent Office, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, and the
Japanese Patent Office. 17 A number of international treaties and TRIPS extend
some similar protections to international technology transfers, including
copyrights, trademarks, geographical indications, industrial designs, patents,
layout designs of integrated circuits, and undisclosed information. 18 Second,
many types of intellectual property are excludable by their owners because
certain types of technology are difficult to observe and very costly to imitate.
Third, in some industries, owners of intellectual property can protect transfers
through license agreements, contractual provisions, and the use of FDI to keep
international technology transfers within the company. Increases in FDI over
time may indicate greater international trade in technology, either as a means of
obtaining or receiving internal transfers of inventions, or as a mechanism for
technology diffusion in host countries.
Erosion of international IP rights will reduce the benefits of international
trade in technology. This will have the effect of discouraging international
trade in goods that embody technology and in disembodied technology.
Companies will be reluctant to export goods that embody technological
advances to those countries that might require compulsory licensing of
technology. Companies already are reluctant to license their technology in
countries with weak IP protections. Countries that apply competition policy to
remove international IP protections offer a business environment that is
comparable to countries that fail to provide IP protections. The uncertainty
created by competition policy that threatens to remove IP protections creates
additional problems for international businesses. Competition policy that
weakens IP rights eliminates the benefits of global competition among
innovators. The costs of such competition policy are less international
technological diffusion and reductions in the quality of innovation.
B. How Microsoft v. Commission Impacts Gains From Trade and
Innovation
The European Commission (formerly the Commission of the European
Communities) is the executive branch of the European Union (EU). The
117 OECD, SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND INDUSTRY SCOREBOARD 2001, at 13.
118 International treaties include the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property, March 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T. 1583; the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as amended in 1979, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1986), 828 U.N.T.S. 221; the International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of
Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations, Rome, Italy, Oct. 26, 1961, 496 U.N.T.S. 43; and the
Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits, May 26, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1477. The
TRIPS Agreement is contained in Annex I C of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994). See TRIPS: Text of the Agreement, World Trade Organization,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/tripse/t-agm0_e.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2008).
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Directorate General for Competition is only one of its many departments,
which include those that would be found in a national government's executive
branch (economic and monetary, affairs, education, health, consumer
protection, energy, trade, and so forth). Since the EU is an alliance of countries,
its competition policy is governed by international treaties. The EU's
competition policy is based on two provisions of the European Community
(EC) treaty. Article 81 covers agreements between two or more firms which
restrict competition such as cartels and price fixing.' 19 Article 82, which states
that firms may not abuse a dominant position, is sufficiently general that
practically any action may be taken against firms with a significant market
share.
1 20
Market share should not be viewed as anticompetitive in itself. The size
and scope of global markets often call for large companies that have the
resources to serve many diverse types of customers. The international business
must also serve corporate customers that operate around the world, including
those operating in the EU. Since many of the large firms operating in Europe
are foreign multinationals, competition policy under Article 82 can be readily
applied to practically any of these companies. European firms with a dominant
market position may be shielded from competition policy under Article 82
through their political influence or due to partial or complete ownership by
European governments. The European Commission and the EU courts take
such political influence into account. For example, in evaluating abuse of a
dominant position in Microsoft v. Commission, the Court cited the EU
legislature's concern with interoperability in the software industry. 21
The EU's policies are aimed at promoting economic, political, and social
cooperation among member countries. Unlike a country such as the United
States, the EU lacks a formal constitution, being governed based on treaties
among sovereign states. 122 The Commission shares enforcement powers with
member countries' court systems and with their competition-policy authorities.
The Commission's decisions are subject to review by the European Court of
Justice (ECJ) and the Court of First Instance. The effectiveness of appeals of
119 See EC Treaty, supra note 13, at art. 81.
120 Id. at art. 82.
121 Microsoft, 2007 E.C.R. at 11-59 - 60.
122 The EU lacks a constitution at this writing, having failed to ratify a proposed constitution.
On December 13, 2007, the 27 EU member states agreed to the Treaty of Lisbon, 2007 O.J. (C306) 1,
although the treaty requires ratification by the states to come into effect. The treaty supplements earlier
agreements, including the Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (1951) (often
referred to as the E.C.S.C. Treaty or the Treaty of Paris), 261 U.N.T.S. 140,, Treaty Establishing the
European Economic Community (1957) (often referred to as the Treaty of Rome or the E.E.C. Treaty),
298 U.N.T.S. 11, Treaty on European Union (1992) (often referred to as Maastricht Agreement)
(consolidated version), 2006 O.J. (C 321) E/5. Amending treaties are the Treaty Establishing a Single
Council and a Single Commission of the European Communities (1965) (often referred to as the Merger
Treaty), 1965 J.O. (152) 1, Treaty of Amsterdam (1997), 1997 O.J. (C340) 1, and Treaty of Nice (2001),
2001 O.J. (C 80) 1. See Europa, Treaties and law, http://europa.eu/abc/treaties/indexen.htm (last visited
Apr. 25, 2008). The year refers to the date the treaty was established, not the date it became effective.
Id.
Yale Journal on Regulation
Commission decisions depends on the degree of independence of the EU courts
from the EU's executive and legislative branches. The ECJ differs from
national courts in several ways: appointments are political with each member
country appointing one judge; only member states can automatically bring a
case while "non-privileged" applicants face restrictions; and the Court only
considers matters relating to the scope of the EU.123
In Microsoft v. Commission, the Court of First Instance exhibited
remarkable deference to the European Commission's report. Based on a careful
review of the highly detailed 248-page decision, I conclude that the Court
supported every assertion and opinion of the Commission and rejected every
assertion and opinion offered by Microsoft. The decision seemed likely to raise
questions about the independence of the EU judiciary. Microsoft agreed to
comply with the European Commission's 2004 ruling in October 2007.
Microsoft's decision not to appeal further to the ECJ was understandable in
light of the limits that EU treaties place on review by the ECJ.
The Commission's decision forced Microsoft to license the
communications protocols from its servers, thereby infringing on its IP rights
and violating the TRIPS Agreement. The Commission's decision also forced
Microsoft to license a degraded version of Windows without Media Player,
thereby infringing on its trademark rights and copyright, thus violating the
TRIPS Agreement. The Court asserted the primacy of EU law, particularly
Article 82, over WTO agreements. The Court further asserted that the WTO
agreement provided for competition policy that reduced IP rights.
124
Competition policy as established by Microsoft v. Commission represents a
fundamental weakness in international IP protection.
Microsoft's compliance involved important IP concessions. Microsoft
would make available Windows Server Software interoperability information
to open source software developers, charging a one-time fee of E10,000, and
minimal royalties to developers such as Sun and IBM for a worldwide license
including patents.' 25 Microsoft announced an additional set of strategic changes
to enhance the interoperability of its products. The company's moves
responded in part to market incentives for interoperability. The company's
actions also sought to comply with EU competition policy while preempting
future regulation. According to Microsoft, "The interoperability principles and
actions announced today reflect the changed legal landscape for Microsoft and
the IT industry. They are an important step forward for the company in its
ongoing efforts to fulfill the responsibilities and obligations outlined in the
123 See George Tridimas, A Political Economy Perspective of Judicial Review in the
European Union: Judicial Appointments Rule, Accessibility and Jurisdiction of the European Court of
Justice, 18 EUROPEAN J.L. & ECON. 99 (2004).
124 Microsoft, 2007 E.C.R. at 11-145,11-213.
125 Lawsky, supra note 9.
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September 2007 judgment of the European Court of First Instance (CFI)."
126
The interoperability disclosures applied to Windows Vista (including the .Net
Framework), Windows Server 2008, SQL Server 2008, Office 2007, Exchange
Server 2007, and Office SharePoint Server 2007, and future versions of all
these products. In addition to industry outreach and an interoperability
initiative, the company announced three key steps. First, it would publish on its
website documentation for all application programming interfaces (APIs) and
communications protocols in these products, making them available without
charge and with immunity from legal challenges to open source developers
from Microsoft. Second, Microsoft would document on its website how it
would comply with industry interoperability standards and make the documents
accessible without a license, royalty, or other fee. Third, Microsoft would
"design new APIs for the Word, Excel and PowerPoint applications in Office
2007 to enable developers to plug in additional document formats and to enable
users to set these formats as their default for saving documents."'127 These
actions illustrate the far-reaching impact of Microsoft v. Commission.
IV. The Effects of Competition on the Incentive to Innovate
The Court's decision and that of the Commission in Microsoft v.
Commission are notable for their focus on market outcomes rather than
anticompetitive conduct. In contrast to U.S. antitrust law, EU competition
policy views a dominant position as a cause for concern in itself. Instead of
examining anticompetitive conduct such as monopolization, the EU considers
market structure. This fails to take into account that a firm may achieve a
dominant position through cost efficiency, superior products, customer service,
and innovation. When firms are penalized for their success, they may seek to
avoid actions that will improve their competitive position and draw the
attention of regulators. The result will be to discourage innovation.
The definition of anticompetitive conduct does not refer to
monopolization but rather to a dominant position that already has been attained.
The concept of "abuse of a dominant position" creates a double standard of
conduct, one for dominant firms and one for non-dominant firms. What is
construed as anticompetitive for a dominant firm may be construed as benignly
competitive for a non-dominant firm. This places different responsibilities on
firms based on their relative market shares. Microsoft v. Commission is a
troubling precedent since it finds that a dominant firm has a "special
responsibility" to provide its IP to competitors. The case risks discouraging
innovation by reducing the returns to investment in R&D.
126 Press Release, Microsoft, Microsoft Makes Strategic Changes in Technology and
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Competition policy that focuses on market shares rather than conduct has
the objective of promoting particular market outcomes rather than vigorous
competition. The policy seeks equality of market shares by handicapping
winners. Regarding the Court's ruling in Microsoft v. Commission, European
Commissioner Neelie Kroes stated that "A market level of much less than 95
percent would be a way of measuring success." 128 Kroes further observed that
"You can't draw a line and say exactly 50 [percent] is correct, but a significant
drop in market share is what we would like to see."
' 29
The effect of competition on the incentive to innovate is a critical issue in
Microsoft v. Commission. At issue is whether competitive markets or
monopolized markets are more innovative. The Commission argued that
competition stimulates innovation while market power reduces innovation.
Commissioner Kroes stated that "monopolists exploiting their strategic position
to conquer new markets are less likely to innovate than companies forced to
compete for customers on the basis of the merits of their products."'
' 30
The Commission viewed competition policy aimed at reducing market
power as a means of stimulating innovation, even at the cost of reducing IP
rights. An overview of the economic analysis of incentives to innovate is useful
for placing the discussion in context.131 This Section presents an economic
analysis that demonstrates that competition between adopters of inventions is
more important for the incentive to innovate. Competition policy that seeks to
eliminate the market power of inventors may decrease the incentive to
innovate. The discussion further shows that competition policy that targets
market outcomes, as occurred in Microsoft v. Commission, is likely to reduce
the incentive to innovate.
A. An Economic Model of Competition and Innovation
Innovation refers to the commercialization of invention. The incentive to
innovate often requires both incentives to invent through R&D and incentives
to bring the invention to the marketplace. The effects of competition on
innovation depend on both the supply of inventions and the demand for
inventions.
128 EU seeks big drop in Microsoft market share, REUTERS, Sept. 17, 2007, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/marketsNews/idUKLI 720058720070917?rpc=44.
129 Id.
130 Neelie Kroes, European Commissioner for Competition Policy, Speech: Antitrust in the
EU and in the US-Our common objectives, (Sept. 26, 2007), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/commission barroso/kroes/antitrust_eu_us.pdf.
131 The discussion in this section assumes complete information. It draws upon a more
general analysis with incomplete information given in Daniel F. Spulber, Incentives to Invent with
Competition and Asymmetric Information (Nw. Univ. Working Paper, 2008). For competition with
asymmetric information about costs, see also Daniel F. Spulber, Bertrand Competition When Rivals'
Costs are Unknown, 43 J. INDUS. ECON. 1 (1995).
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Competition thus affects innovation in two ways. On the supply side of
the market for inventions, inventors compete to create inventions and to
provide them to potential adopters. On the demand side of the market, potential
adopters compete to obtain inventions and to provide their customers with
products that are based on the inventions. A comprehensive analysis of the
effects of competition on innovation should consider competition on the supply
side and on the demand side of the market for invention.
Competition among suppliers of inventions is an important phenomenon.
Even if inventions are scientifically unique, difficult to copy, or protected by
patent, there are alternative inventions that are substitutes in demand. As
Edmund Kitch cogently observed, "patents that confer monopoly market power
are rare." 132 Kitch discusses "elementary and persistent errors in the economic
analysis of intellectual property" noting particularly the incorrect assertion that
exclusivity in intellectual property confers an economic monopoly. Even when
IP rights confer exclusive ownership to inventors, competition among
substitute inventions is feasible. Such competition reduces or eliminates the
market power of specific inventions. In the same way, copyrighted works
compete with each other.' 33 Having a copyright on a unique work such as a
novel or a play confers some market power, but that work competes with other
literature. The Justice Department recognizes the possibility of competition
among owners of IP. The Antitrust Guidelines for Licensing of Intellectual
Property state that "[t]he Agencies will not presume that a patent, copyright, or
trade secret necessarily confers market power upon its owner."'
' 34
Firms that adopt inventions can employ them to establish new production
processes, to implement new business methods, or to provide new products.
Changes in production processes are referred to as process innovations and
changes in final products are referred to as product innovations. Firms' demand
for inventions depends on the returns they receive to commercializing the
invention, that is, their demand for inventions depends on the returns to
innovation.
Inventions that are very different can be demand substitutes for the firms
that adopt the inventions. For instance, inventions with different scientific and
engineering details and patent protections can offer comparable cost savings.
These inventions yield process innovations that are substitutes in demand
within such categories as machine tools, industrial robots, enterprise software,
factory designs, lasers, or chemical processes. Different inventions can be used
to develop new products with competing features. These inventions yield
132 Edmund W. Kitch, Elementary and Persistent Errors in the Economic Analysis of
Intellectual Property, 53 VAND L. REV. 1727, 1730 (2000).
133 See Paul Goldstein, Copyright, 55 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79, 79-82 (1992); Christopher
S. Yoo, Copyright and Product Differentiation, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 212 (2004).
134 U.S. Dep't of Justice & Fed. Trade Commission, Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of
Intellectual Property §§ 2.0, 2.2 (1995), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,132, at 20,734-35.
Yale Journal on Regulation
product innovations that are substitutes in demand within such categories as
appliances, electronic gadgets, automobiles, cameras, fabrics, or medicines.
Government officials charged with regulation and competition policy
must be careful in distinguishing the effects of policies on the demand side
from those on the supply side of the market for inventions. It is necessary to
consider both the industrial organization of the invention industry and
industrial organization of industries that employ inventions in production and
product design.1
35
Classifying the supply side and the demand side of the market for
inventions as monopolistic or competitive generates four possible market
categories. More distinctions based on the extent of competition on either side
of the market would generate more categories. However, the basic
classification is sufficient to illustrate the main points of the discussion. Let V
represent the returns obtained by an inventor in the market for inventions,
without considering the costs of invention. Table 1 lists the incentives to invent
for the four market categories.
135 Schumpeter emphasized that firms with market power tend to innovate more. See Joseph
A. Schumpeter, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY (1975). The effects of market structure on
R&D that are discussed here are useful for analyzing the effects of regulatory policy. Generally, market
structure and R&D investment are determined jointly in a market equilibrium. See, e.g., Partha
Dasgupta, Patents, Priority and Imitation or, the Economics of Races and Waiting Games, 98 ECON. J.
66 (1988); Partha Dasgupta & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Industrial Structure and the Nature of Innovative
Activity, 90 ECON. J. 266 (1986); Almarin Phillips, Patents, Potential Competition and Technical
Progress, 56 AM. ECON. REV. 301 (1966); Pankaj Tandon, Innovation, Market Structure, and Welfare,
74 AM. ECON. REV. 394 (1984). Using a model based on Dasgupta and Stightz, Tandon finds that
market concentration improves economic efficiency. In Tandon, as in related models, each firm chooses
both output and its own cost-reducing R&D so that the demand for and supply of innovations are not
separated as in the present analysis,
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The incentive to invent with different market structures on the demand
side and on the supply side of the invention market
The discussion in this Section considers both the supply side and the
demand side of the invention market. On the supply side, I examine
competition between inventors selling different inventions. I compare
competing inventors with a monopolist inventor that operates multiple research
and development projects and chooses the best invention. On the demand side,
I examine how the incentive to invent is affected depending on whether the
product market is monopolistic or competitive. A monopoly inventor selling to
a monopoly product market is equivalent to a monopoly that is vertically
integrated and invents for its own use, as Kenneth Arrow originally assumed in
his celebrated discussion of invention. 1
36
Arrow's discussion considers the demand-side effects of competition in
the invention market. 137 Arrow does not examine supply-side effects because
he assumes that the inventor is a monopolist. A competitive final product
market creates more demand for invention than does a monopolistic final
product market. Because a competitive product market is more efficient than a
monopolistic one, it generates greater rents for the inventor.
Because Arrow's inventor is a monopolist, the inventor can choose a
royalty to extract monopoly rents for his invention. The inventor is able to
appropriate the private information that the invention represents. Arrow shows
that the inventor's profit is greater in the competitive situation than in the
monopoly situation. Arrow's result is that a competitive product market
provides a greater incentive to invent than a monopolistic product market.
Arrow's invention is a cost reduction, although he points out that the
analysis of a new product should be similar. Following Arrow, let co represent
136 Arrow, supra note 106.
137 Id. See also Kenneth J. Arrow, Classificatory Notes on the Production and Transmission
of Technological Knowledge, 59 AM. ECON. REV. 29 (1969).
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unit cost before the invention. The invention lowers unit cost so that c is the
unit cost after the invention, where c < Co.
Market demand for the final good in the product market is D(p), where p
is the product price. 138 The total profit of all producers in the product market,
excluding any costs associated with invention or royalties equals
(I) r(p, c) = (p - c)D(p)
Consider first Arrow's competitive situation in which a monopoly
inventor sells the invention to all producers in a competitive product market.
The inventor sets a per-unit royalty equal to r. Since the product market is
competitive, the initial price before the invention is introduced equals unit cost,
Po = Co. What royalty will the inventor choose?
Since the inventor is selling the invention to a competitive market, the
post-royalty price is the unit cost plus the royalty:
(2) p = c + r
The competitive producers will adopt the invention if and only if the royalty
plus the new unit cost does not exceed the unit cost under the old technology:
(3) c + r:co
The inventor's profit is equal to the royalty times the sales of the competitive
industry:
(4) 11 = rD(c + r)
The inventor chooses the royalty to maximize profit subject to the maximum
royalty constraint.
Arrow identifies two important possibilities. First, if the cost reduction is
drastic, then the royalty constraint is nonbinding because the cost reduction is
large. The invention is said to be drastic if the profit-maximizing price under
the new technology does not exceed the unit cost under the old technology,
pm(C) < Co. With a drastic invention, the unconstrained royalty maximizes the
inventor's profit. This is equivalent to choosing a final product price that
maximizes the downstream industry profit. Thus, the unconstrained royalty is
simply the downstream monopoly price minus the unit cost under the new
technology:
(5) r'(c) =p'(c) - c
The monopoly inventor selling to the competitive product market extracts all of
the profit that would be obtained if the final product industry were a
monopoly. 1
39
Second, the invention is nondrastic if the monopoly price under the new
technology is greater than the unit cost under the old technology, pr(c) > Co.
Then, the monopoly inventor will set the highest possible royalty subject to the
138 Assume that demand is a twice continuously differentiable and decreasing function of the
product price p. Suppose that profit is concave in price. The profit-maximizing price, pr(c), is unique
and increasing in cost c.
139 With a drastic invention, the inventor's incentive to invent equals VMC(c) = 7r(pm(c), c)
(po(c) - c)O(p (c)).
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now-binding royalty constraint. The royalty will equal the cost reduction from
the invention:
(6) rm(c) = co - c
With a nondrastic invention, the monopoly inventor selling to the competitive
product market obtains the downstream industry's cost savings. 140
Consider next the situation in which the monopoly inventor sells the
invention to a downstream firm that has a monopoly in the product market.'
4 1
Let R be the monopoly inventor's lump-sum royalty. Then, the downstream
monopolist purchases the invention that reduces the unit cost to c if and only if
the increase in profit for the downstream firm that employs the new technology
is greater than or equal to the royalty.
142
The monopoly inventor able to make a first-and-final offer will raise the
lump-sum royalty to equal the downstream monopolist's willingness to pay.
Therefore, the monopoly inventor's incentive to invent when selling the
invention to a monopoly product market is just equal to the downstream firm's
increase in profit due to the reduction in unit cost.
Comparing incentives to invent when the downstream market is
competitive with incentives when it is monopolistic gives Arrow's result.
143
Proposition 1 (Arrow): The incentive to invent for a monopoly inventor is
greater when selling the invention to a competitive product market than when
selling the invention to a monopolistic product market, VJc > VMM
This proposition highlights the importance of the customer market in
providing incentives to innovation. In Microsoft v. Commission, the demand
side of the relevant markets was highly competitive. The demand side in server
software refers to the many companies that buy servers and the necessary
140 With a nondrastic invention, the inventor's profit will equal WmC(c) = r"(c)D(c + rI(c)) =
(co - c)D(ca).
141 Arrow describes this case as that of a vertically-integrated monopoly in which a
monopoly inventor also has a monopoly in the product market and uses the invention there himself. For
the monopoly inventor selling to a downstream monopoly to correspond to Arrow's vertically integrated
monopoly, several conditions must hold. The monopoly inventor must be able to commit to a first-and-
final offer of the invention and royalty. In addition, the monopoly inventor must use a lump-sum royalty
rather than a royalty per-unit of final output. The inventor cannot offer a per-unit royalty because doing
so would create price distortions just as in the standard problem of double-marginalization.
142 The downstream monopolist's initial profit using the old technology equals
7r(p(ca), ca) = (p"(co) - ca)D(pm(c)). The change in profit for the downstream monopolist must be
greater than or equal to the royalty, .4r"(c, ca) = 7r(p(c), c) - 7r(p(ca), co) > R. Therefore, the incentive
to invent is the maximum royalty which equals the downstream firm's cost reduction, JAWM(c) = R
.,r'(c, co).
143 If the invention is drastic, that is p"(c) 5 co, then the monopoly inventor's incentive to
invent when selling the invention to a downstream monopoly is less than when selling the invention to a
downstream competitive industry. This is because the incentive in the monopoly case, Jn"(c, ca),
subtracts the foregone profit under the old technology while the incentive in the competitive case,
7r(p'(c), c), does not. If the invention is nondrastic, the inventor's incentive in the monopoly case is still
Jr '(c, ca), which is lower than the competitive case since Afre(c, ca) = J'OcD(pm(x))dx<(co-c)D(co)
The argument is as follows. Since p"(c) is increasing in c, it follows that pm(x) > p(c) for all x > c.
Because the invention is nondrastic, it follows that p'(c) > co. Since demand is downward sloping
demand, D(p'(x)) < D(co) for all x > c. This establishes Arrow's result.
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operating system software. The demand side of PC operating systems includes
the many consumers of PCs and the necessary operating system software.
Consumers also represented the demand for media players.
How will competing inventors affect Arrow's result? Suppose that there
are n competing inventors with different inventions represented by unit costs ci,
i = 1 .... n. For convenience of discussion, let these inventions be ordered by
increasing cost, cl < c 2 < ... < c,. The inventors are substitutes for each other
and for the initial technology because only one technology can be employed in
production. All inventions are improvements on the old technology c, < co for
all i. Designate the least-cost invention, cl, as the best invention and c 2 as the
second-best invention.
Consider first the situation in which the downstream product market is
competitive. Competing inventors choose a per-unit royalty as in the full
information setting. The inventors engage in Bertrand price competition in
setting their royalty rates. As before, the final price in the downstream
competitive product market equals unit production cost plus the per-unit
royalty, p = r + c. The choice of royalty rates is equivalent to choosing the
final product price in the competitive market. The inventor with the best
invention offers a royalty that is constrained by the second-best invention, r <
C2 - Cl"
If the cost difference between the best invention cl and the next-best
invention c2 is sufficiently large, that is, p(c 1) <_ C2, then competition has little
or no effect. The best inventor chooses the final product price p*(c) = pm(c).
The inventor with the best invention obtains monopoly returns for his invention
and the market price for the final product equals the monopoly price. Thus,
when competitive differences are large, the total incentive to invent for
competing inventors selling to a downstream competitive market equals the
monopoly profit for the downstream industry evaluated at the unit cost of the
best technology.
(7) J/CC(cl, cz)= r(p'(cj), cl)
This situation can be characterized as a drastic difference between the best and
the second-best technology.
Suppose in contrast that the difference in cost between the best invention
and the next-best invention is small. The difference in technologies is small if
the monopoly price for the downstream industry evaluated at the unit cost of
best technology is greater than the unit cost of the second-best technology, that
is, if pm(c) > c 2. Then, the winning inventor chooses a price equal to the unit
cost offered by the second-best invention p*(cl) = c2 and earns profit
(8) VCC(c 1 , C2) = (C2 - c1)D(c2)
This situation can be characterized as a nondrastic difference between the best
and the second-best technology. This is illustrated in Figure 1.
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Profit of the least-cost inventor when there are small technology
differences between the best and second-best invention.
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Figure 1 shows the profit of the least cost inventor with competition and
full information when there is a nondrastic technology difference between the
best and second-best invention. This outcome corresponds to a market in
which regulators mandate technology licensing and disclosure. Compulsory
licensing and disclosure reduce the difference between the technology of the
inventor and the technology of competing firms even if the underlying
invention is drastic. Narrowing the difference between the best and second-best
invention reduces the incentive to invent.
Consider competition among inventors when the difference between the
best and second-best invention is nondrastic. As c2 approaches cl, the profit of
the inventor with the best invention approaches zero. Combining the two
possibilities, the final product price offered by the inventor with the best
invention is the minimum of the monopoly price for a firm using the best
technology and the unit cost of a firm using the second-best technology. 
144
Consider next the situation in which competing inventors try to sell their
invention to a product monopoly downstream. The inventors offer their
inventions at the lump-sum royalty rates of Ri, i = 1,. .. , n. The monopoly
chooses the best invention if and only if the profit from adopting the best
technology net of the corresponding royalty is greater than the profit from
adopting the second-best technology net of the corresponding royalty.
Inventors compete by choosing royalties. The maximum royalty that the
inventor with the best invention can obtain with competition equals the
difference in profit for the downstream firm using the best versus the second-
best technology. 1
45
This implies that the incentive to invent for competing inventors selling to
a monopolistic product market is the profit difference between the best and the
second-best technology. The incentive to invent for competing inventors selling
to a monopolistic product market can be written as
(9) JrCM(C], c2) = der(c], cZ)
Now, it is possible to compare the situation in which competing inventors
offer their inventions to a downstream competitive product industry with that in
which competing inventors offer their inventions to a downstream product
monopoly. 1
46
144 This is represented as p*(c,) = min (p'(c), c2), and that inventor's profit is PCC(cj, cz) =
1r(p*(cd, c). The royalty resulting from competition is r*(c) = p*(c) - c,. As long as there is
competition between inventors, p*(c) always is less than the cost under the old technology. Thus, all
inventions can be viewed as drastic, that is, the maximum royalty constraint due to the initial technology
is nonbinding. The initial technology has no effect on the outcome since the inventor's return depends
only on the technology of the next-best invention. Since all discoveries lower final cost, the final
product price is strictly less than initial cost as a result of competition, p*(c,) < co.
145 Because the downstream firm chooses the best technology if and only if Ir(p'(c), c) - R,
_ ir(p'(cz), c2)) - R2, it follows that the competitive royalty offered by the best inventor equals R, =
7r(p'(cl, Cl) - lr(p'(c2), c,) = 4,r'n(cl, c2).
146 The proposition holds as follows. If competitive differences are large, p'(c1) < c2, the total
incentive to invent with downstream competition, ;r(p'(cd, cd, is greater than it is with a downstream
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Proposition 2: Competing inventors selling to a downstream competitive
product market have a greater total incentive to invent than when selling the
inventions to a downstream monopolistic product market, IVCC(cl, c 2) > VM(c,
C2).
Arrow's demand-side effects still hold when inventors compete. With
competing inventions, the total incentive to invent is greater with downstream
competition than with downstream monopoly because the second-best
invention takes the place of the old technology as a standard of comparison for
the new technology. When inventors compete, the problem with monopoly is
not inertia associated with the old technology, as commonly believed. Rather,
Proposition 2 shows that the reduced incentive to invent under monopoly is due
to the profitability to the downstream monopoly of any alternative technology,
even the second-best invention.
This proposition further highlights the importance of the customer market
in providing incentives to innovation. As already noted, in Microsoft v.
Commission, the demand sides of the relevant markets were highly
competitive. The benefits of downstream competition in generating returns to
invention apply with upstream competition among inventors.
We now examine the effects of competition among inventors on the
incentive to invent in comparison with a monopoly inventor. To make a proper
comparison with competing inventors, the monopoly inventor can run multiple
R&D projects. The monopoly inventor has n projects that produce inventions
ci, i = 1 .... n. The monopolist will use only the best invention, cl. Firms
sometimes pursue parallel R&D projects. Multiple projects can increase the
quality of the best invention.1
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Consider the situation in which competing inventors offer their inventions
to a downstream competitive product market. Recall that if competitive
differences between inventions are large, pm(c)) < c2, the best inventor has the
same incentive to invent as a monopoly inventor with invention cl that is
selling to a downstream competitive product market. Therefore, when the
downstream product market is competitive, the total incentive to invent with
competing inventors is the same as for the monopoly inventor,
Jc(cl, c2) = Vmc(cl, c2) = 7r(pm(cl), cj).
This implies the following result.
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monopoly, zn'(c,, cz). If competitive differences are small, p'(c,) > c2, the total incentive to invent with
downstream competition, (c2 - c,)D(cz), is greater than it is with a downstream monopoly, Axr(c,, cz).
147 See Nelson, supra note 1088.
148 If competitive differences between inventions are small, p"(c) > c2, recall that the best
inventor's incentive to invent is (c2 - c)D(cz). If the best invention is drastic in Arrow's sense, p'(c) 5
co, recall that the monopolist's incentive to invent when selling to a competitive product market equals
the profit of a downstream monopolist. The monopolist's incentive to invent is greater than it is for
competing inventors since (p(c) - cdD(p'(cd) > (c2 - c)D(c2). This follows from the definition of
profit maximization and p"(c) > c2. If the best invention is nondrastic in Arrow's sense, p'(cd) > co,
recall that the monopolist's incentive to invent when selling to a competitive market equals (co -
cd)D(ca), which is greater than it is for competing inventors selling to a competitive market, (c2 -
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Proposition 3: A monopoly inventor selling to a competitive product
market has an incentive to invent that is greater than or equal to the total
incentive to invent of competing inventors selling to a competitive product
market, VmC(cj, c) > VCC(cj, c).
This result challenges the notion in Microsoft v. Commission that
competition stimulates innovation. Competition among inventors, by
dissipating rents, may reduce the incentive to invent relative to a monopoly. An
inventor with market power may obtain greater returns to invention, leading it
to do additional research and develop new products. Competition policy aimed
at reducing the market power of inventors may reduce these incentives to
invent.
With competing inventors selling to a monopolistic product market, the
total incentive to invent is VCM(cl, c 2) = Azrm(cl, c 2). Compare this situation with
a monopoly inventor selling to a monopolistic product market. When selling to
a downstream monopoly, the monopoly inventor's incentive to invent will be
the same as that given by Arrow, VMm(cj, c2) = Arm(cl, co).
Proposition 4: A monopoly inventor selling to a monopolistic product
market has an incentive to invent that is greater than the total incentive to
invent of competing inventors selling to a monopolist product market, V4 'M(cl,
c2) > VcM(cI, c2). Again, competition among inventors dissipates the returns to
invention. This can mean that a monopoly inventor has greater incentives to
invent even when the downstream market is monopolistic.
Combining these results has an additional implication. 1
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Proposition 5: A monopoly inventor selling to a competitive product
market has an incentive to invent that is greater than the total incentive to
invent of competing inventors selling to a monopolist product market, vMC(c1,
c 2) > JfM(cl, c2). This result follows from two effects that reinforce each other.
The combination of upstream monopoly and downstream competition increase
the incentive to invent in comparison with the combination of upstream
competition and downstream monopoly.
Now compare the monopoly inventor selling to a downstream monopoly
product market with competing inventors selling their inventions to
competitive producers. With competition among inventors, the inventor with
the best invention takes into account the quality of the next best invention. In
contrast, the monopoly inventor only compares the best invention with the old
technology. 1
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c)D(c2). This follows from profit maximization and p"(c) > co > c2, which implies that a price equal to
co generates greater profit than a pnce equal to than c2 because co is closer to the monopoly pnce. This
implies that VmC(cl, cz) > V/cC(c,, c2) when competitive differences are small.
149 This result can be obtained in two different ways. First, note that W"c(c, cz) > "MM(cj, cz)
> V/CM(cj, cz). Second, note that 01C(cl, c2 ).> Vcc(c cd)> PCM( c2).
150 If competitive differences between inventions are large, p(c) !5 c2, the total incentive to
invent under competition, /CC(cl, c2) = 7r(p'(c). c,) is greater than that of the monopoly inventor selling
to a downstream monopoly product market. However, if competitive differences between inventions are
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Proposition 6: When the costs of the best invention and the second-best
invention are similar, the incentive to invent for a monopoly inventor selling to
a downstream product monopoly (or equivalently a vertically-integrated
monopoly with multiple projects) is greater than the total incentive to invent
with competing inventors selling to a downstream competitive product market,
VMM(c, c9 > V2C(cj, c2). When these costs differ substantially, competing
inventors have a greater total incentive to invent than the monopoly inventor
selling to a downstream product monopoly.
151
If the demand-side effect predominates over the supply-side effect,
competing inventors selling to a competitive product market have a greater
total incentive to invent than the monopolist inventor selling to a monopolistic
product market, conforming to Arrow's result. Conversely, if the supply-side
effect predominates over the demand-side effect, the monopolist inventor
selling to a monopolistic product market has a greater incentive to invent,
differing from Arrow's result. When inventions are similar, supply-side effects
of competition between inventors overcome the demand-side effects of
competition on the incentive to invent.'
5 2
This result has an important implication for competition policy that targets
IP. Competing inventors may obtain inventions that have drastic differences.
The potential returns for the successful firm will stimulate inventive activity.
However, if competition policy narrows the differences among technologies,
the result will be to reduce returns for successful firms and reduce inventive
activity. Compulsory disclosure and forced licensing serves to eliminate drastic
technology differences among competing inventors. The result will be
technologies that are similar. By reducing the rewards to invention, the benefits
of competition among inventors are reduced or eliminated. A monopoly
inventor will have greater incentives to invent than competing inventors with
narrow differences in their technology.
small, p'(cd) > c2, then the monopoly inventor selling to a downstream monopoly product market has
greater profits when
lC(c, c2) = (c2 - c)D(cz) <;r (pV(c,), c) -V(p"( ca) = Jcc, D(p(x))dx. For c 2 sufficiently close to
cl, the incentive to invent for competing inventors becomes arbitrarily small. Define a critical value c 2"
as the solution to (c2 * - c)D(c2 *) = fc" D(p'(x))dx. Thus, for all competing second-best inventions c2
such that ci < c2 < c2*, the total incentive to invent is lower for the competing inventors selling to a
competitive product market than for the monopoly inventor selling to a downstream monopoly product
market.
151 For any best invention cl, there exists a critical value c2" > c/ such that for all competing
second-best inventions c2 such that c1 < c2 < c2*, the incentive to invent for a monopoly inventor selling
to a downstream product monopoly (or equivalently a vertically-integrated monopoly with multiple
projects) is greater than the total incentive to invent with competing inventors selling to a downstream
competitive product market, mm (ci, c) > .cc(c, cz).
152 When each inventor has private information about the quality of his invention, the supply-
side effect predominates over the demand-side effect if and only if the number of inventors is
sufficiently large. The reason is that more intense competition between inventors erodes the total
incentive to invent in comparison to the monopolist inventor selling to a monopolistic product market,
see Spulber, Incentives to Invent with Competition and Asymmetric Information (Nw. Univ. Sch. of Law
Working Paper, 2008).
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Competition among inventors dissipates economic rents. Accordingly,
more competition on the supply side of the invention market decreases the
incentive to invent. In the economics literature, other frameworks show that
competition among inventors dissipates economic rents. Competition lowers
returns to invention when firms race to develop an invention.1 53 Invention
tournaments stimulate inventive effort in comparison with individual contracts
but competition still lowers the incentive to invent.'
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Incentives to innovate also affect the number of R&D projects. The inertia
of a vertically-integrated monopolist that Arrow identified tends to occur when
there is a single R&D project. This is because the potential invention resulting
from the single project is compared to the existing technology. However, with
multiple projects, the monopoly inventor makes decisions at the margin,
choosing the number of parallel projects based on their marginal contribution.
Although this helps to overcome the inertia from the existing technology, the
monopoly inventor selling to a downstream monopolistic market is still less
innovative than a monopoly selling to a competitive downstream product
market. This is due to beneficial effects of downstream competition on the
expected marginal returns to R&D projects. Also, more competing inventors
enter the market for inventions when the downstream product market is
competitive than when the downstream market is monopolistic.
Entry of inventors depends on the average returns to invention. The
number of projects chosen by a monopolist depends on the marginal returns to
invention. The number of competing inventors that enter the market can be
greater or less than the number of projects chosen by a monopoly inventor,
whether they are selling their inventions to a competitive product market or to a
monopolistic product market or if the competing inventors sell to a competitive
153 The literature on racing to invent generally assumes that inventions are identical, with an
exclusive monopoly patent going to the firm that wins the race. See, e.g., Partha Dasgupta & Joseph
Stiglitz, Uncertainty, Industrial Structure, and the Speed of R&D, 11 BELL J. OF ECON. 1 (1980);
Richard J. Gilbert & David M. G. Newbery, Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence ofMonopoly, 72
AM. ECON. REv. 514 (1982). For a survey of the racing literature, see Jennifer Reinganum, The Timing
of Innovation: Research, Development, and Diffusion, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
849 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert Willig eds., 1989). On licensing of inventions, see Michael L. Katz
& Carl Shapiro, R&D Rivalry with Licensing or Imitation, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 402 (1987); Stephen
Salant, Comment, Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of Monopoly, 74 AM. ECON. REv. 247
(1984). Various studies examine oligopoly competition among firms who undertake internal R&D to
lower their own costs. See, e.g., Dasgupta & Stiglitz, supra note 135; Joshua S. Gans & Scott Stem,
Incumbency and R&D Incentives: Licensing the Gale of Creative Destruction, 9 J. ECON. & MGMT.
STRATEGY 485 (2000).
154 The literature on research tournaments studies the design of incentives for inventive
effort. In a tournament, a sponsor designs the prize for the best innovation and contestants devote effort
to producing inventions. See, e.g., Yeon-Koo Che & Ian Gale, Optimal Design of Research Contests,
AM. ECON. REv. 646 (2003); Curtis R. Taylor, Diggingfor Golden Carrots: An Analysis of Research
Tournaments, 85 AM. ECON. REv. 872 (1995). Baye and Hoppe show that racing and tournaments are
equivalent. See Michael R. Baye & Heidrun H. Hoppe, The Strategic Equivalence of Rent-Seeking,
Innovation, and Patent-Race Games, 44 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 217 (2003). In contrast to the racing
literature, the analysis in this Section assumes that inventions differ and that inventors compete after
making their discoveries. In contrast to the tournaments approach, the analysis in this Section does not
examine inventive effort and focuses on the effects of market structure on the incentive to invent.
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product market and the monopoly inventor sells to a monopolistic product
market. Competitive entry and the choice of multiple R&D projects by firms
affect outcomes in the market for inventions.
The analysis of the incentive to invent strongly suggests the need for
regulatory forbearance. The incentive to innovate depends on both demand-side
and supply-side factors. Greater competition among users of the invention
tends to increase the incentive to invent, as Arrow observed. Greater
competition among inventors can reduce the incentive to invent by dissipating
rents. Policymakers should identify carefully the demand-side and the supply-
side effects of competition in markets for innovation. 155 Sorting out these
effects is likely to be difficult in practice. Policymakers cannot expect that
competition policy will result in increased incentive to innovate.
Although patents offer property rights with some degree of exclusion,
inventors still face competition from other inventors that develop substitute
inventions. The tradeoff offered by the length of patent lives is well known.
Longer patent lives confer property rights that can increase the incentive to
invent while longer patent lives might reduce the diffusion of innovations. This
tradeoff bears further examination in light of the effects of competing inventors
on the incentive to invent. The possibility that a vertically-integrated firm with
market power may be highly innovative suggests the need for antitrust
forbearance in vertical and horizontal merger policy.
B. Microsoft v. Commission Addresses Market Outcomes Rather than
Competition
The European Commission argued that by promoting competition, it was
also increasing the incentive to innovate. Putting aside the effects of eroding IP
rights, does competition necessarily stimulate innovation? The discussion in the
previous Section demonstrates that competition among customers of
technology generates rents that increase the demand for innovation. However,
competition among companies that engage in innovation dissipates rents and
can reduce the supply of innovation. Competition among inventors can
generate more or less resources devoted to invention in comparison with a
monopoly inventor that operates multiple R&D projects. The outcome depends
on how the average returns to R&D with competing inventors compare with the
marginal returns to invention of a monopoly inventor. Between the extremes of
competition and monopoly, having more inventors reduces the rents to
invention.
The link between competition and innovation is far more complex than
the Commission believes. Competition policy that promotes competition for its
155 Christopher Yoo, Vertical Integration and Media Regulation in the New Economy, 19
YALE J. ON REG. 171, 276-78 (2002) (discussing the ambiguity of empirical results, suggesting that this
careful analysis should be valuable).
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own sake need not result in greater innovation. The economic rents generated
by successful products can be dissipated by public policy that promotes
competition at all costs. The result will be fewer innovations, resulting in less
product variety and higher production costs. Consumers are made worse off by
an industry that competes more and innovates less. Consumers will be willing
to pay more for a product that offers improved features.
Microsoft already faced substantial competition in the market for server
operating systems software. The complaints of competitors such as Sun
illustrate that such competition was vigorous before the intervention of the
Commission. The efforts of the Commission to heighten price competition by
eliminating technology differences merely served to dissipate the rents to
innovation. This will lower the returns to improvements in server operating
systems. The demand side of the server operating systems market was highly
competitive. Many firms purchased this software for their servers.
Improvements in server operating systems lowered the production costs for
firms that purchased the software.
Competition policy that targets market outcomes rather than
anticompetitive conduct reduces the expected rewards for successful firms.
Policies that place asymmetric burdens on firms that have larger market shares
will reduce the incentive to innovate for both large and small firms. Deterrence
of innovation may cause firms to seek other avenues of competition, from high-
priced branding strategies to bargain-basement pricing strategies. At risk are
the potential benefits of new products, new technologies, and new transaction
methods. Consumers are harmed when competition policy diminishes the
incentive to innovate.
V. Conclusion
Microsoft v. Commission diminishes the incentive to innovate in several
critical ways. By reducing IP protections, Microsoft v. Commission reduced the
incentive to innovate both for successful firms and for their competitors. The
Court extended the essential facilities doctrine to IP to justify reduction of IP
protections. In addition, the Court justified unbundled access IP, setting a
dangerous precedent that allows policymakers to target specific elements of
software, or more generally, specific ideas contained within inventions.
Companies will be reluctant to invest in R&D if they face mandatory
unbundling and disclosure of their inventions. Competitors will be discouraged
from investing in R&D if they can obtain IP from leading firms by the threat of
complaints to competition policymakers.
By rejecting international IP protections, Microsoft v. Commission
reduces the beneficial effects of international trade on the incentive to innovate.
The Commission viewed ccmpetition policy as working "in tandem" with its
EU trade policy. The case signaled an activist competition policy that would
target successful companies and seek to limit global competition. The decisions
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of the Court and of the European Commission reflect underlying concerns
about global competition within the European Union. Rather than relying on
the innovative abilities of companies within the EU, competition policymakers
chose instead to penalize a company for its market success. Instead of trusting
European companies to develop new technology and trusting European
consumers to make informed decisions, EU policymakers chose a protectionist
industrial policy. The European Commission soon identified Intel and other
large international companies as future targets. The question is whether the EU
wishes to participate in the global marketplace, or whether it prefers to erect a
fortress of regulations that deter foreign competitors.
By focusing on market outcomes rather than competitive conduct,
Microsoft v. Commission limits the incentive of firms to succeed by innovation.
Companies in every industry face an existential dilemma. If the company does
not devote resources to innovation, the firm will be at a competitive
disadvantage. However, if the company devotes resources to innovation and is
successful in the marketplace, it risks antitrust scrutiny. A firm can gain a
competitive advantage through successful innovation, at least temporarily. Yet,
a dominant position risks legal action from the EU that can result in large fines,
compulsory licensing, mandatory disclosure, and unbundling of IP. This will
make firms reluctant to invest in research, to commercialize inventions, and to
develop new products. The more successful a company has been in the
marketplace in the past, the more its future innovations will be scrutinized. The
doctrine of "abuse of a dominant position" as interpreted in Microsoft v.
Commission targets success rather than anticompetitive behavior.
Competition policy that weakens IP rights affects the incentives to
innovate for firms in practically any industry. The result is less innovation at
the margin and harm to consumer welfare. Competition policy that weakens
international IP protections reduces the diffusion of innovation across
international borders and diminishes the potential gains from trade associated
with international markets for technology. Competition policy that targets
successful firms reduces the returns to invention.

